University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses

Graduate School

5-2017

Color-Blind Stancetaking in Racialized Discourse
Abigail Christine Tobias-Lauerman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, atobiasl@vols.utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes
Part of the African American Studies Commons, Anthropological Linguistics and Sociolinguistics
Commons, Discourse and Text Linguistics Commons, Other English Language and Literature Commons,
Race and Ethnicity Commons, and the Rhetoric Commons

Recommended Citation
Tobias-Lauerman, Abigail Christine, "Color-Blind Stancetaking in Racialized Discourse. " Master's Thesis,
University of Tennessee, 2017.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4785

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE:
Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Abigail Christine Tobias-Lauerman entitled "ColorBlind Stancetaking in Racialized Discourse." I have examined the final electronic copy of this
thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in English.
Jessi Grieser, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Lisa King, Martin Griffin
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Color-Blind Stancetaking in Racialized Discourse

A Thesis Presented for the
Master of Arts
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Abigail Christine Tobias-Lauerman
May 2017

ii

ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I examine how language constructs and constrains racialized discourse in
post-Jim Crow contemporary America. Drawing on rhetorical and sociolinguistic work set forth
by Booth, Shotwell, Bonilla-Silva, Omi and Winant, and others, it is apparent that racial
organization— and racial identities and categorization— in the US is reliant upon specific
markers that signify racial meaning. Such markers are assimilated into wider, unconscious
discourse through what Shotwell and Booth describe as seemingly inherent— yet ultimately
constructed— matters of “common sense,” and are expressed through evaluative stance acts. I
explore the origins and construction of these markers and the relationship between color-blind
racism and language through the framework of Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus/doxa schema. Bourdieu
illuminates the ways current racial language denies self-reflexivity, instead maintaining its own
survival by way of “common sense.” To apply these principles, I analyze four public statements
made during the 2006 racially-charged “Jena Six” situation in Louisiana— two who are critical
of the Jena Six, and two who are in support of them— as the Jena Six case, trial, and surrounding
public response provide numerous points of comparison to more recent racialized events. To
analyze the four statements, I apply five rhetorical “rules” that I develop from Bonilla-Silva’s
definitions of color-blind language, and I look at the ways in which the logic within each
statement is mediated through a “common sense” racial knowledge and expressed through
stancetaking. What is observed in the two statements that are critical of the Jena Six is a unified
yet flexible system of racial thought that works to preserve current racial conditions, while the
two statements made in support of the Six utilize language and logic that suggest avenues for
boundary-breaking in regards to available racial language and subsequent racial realities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With no fewer than ten highly-publicized deaths of black males at the hands of law
enforcement in the past three years, racially-charged— and at times violent— public protest and
debate appears to be an ever-present component of political and social discourse in the United
States. Yet, despite both public and political actions, it seems that lasting progress, or at least
lasting change, is never made, and the conversations that surround such efforts seem to differ
only in the particulars of the case at hand. If discourse in the United States— particularly that
which erupts in times of highly-publicized and politically-charged conflict or confrontation
where questions of race as a salient issue are debated— is both predictable and ineffective in
bringing about significant and lasting change, what are the characteristics that make it so? What
language strategies, particularly among the general public, are consistently used when discussing
issues where race is a significant factor? Furthermore, why does such language appear to
consistently fail in disrupting current racial attitudes and systems and in preventing further (often
violent) conflict? In the research that follows, I will argue that:
a. The current racial system in the United States is organized by a logic that is deemed
“color-blind,” but is in fact established in a way that maintains white racial and social
dominance and can thus be called color-blind racism.
b. Color-blind logic in the US is a constructed and constructing system of thought that
both provides and constrains the language available to conceive of and communicate
about race and racial issues.
c. The language that color-blindness makes available, which I will call color-blind
language, is identifiable and open to critique and challenge; yet, such identification is
discouraged under the self-protecting and self-perpetuating structure and function of
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color-blindness, thus limiting the extent and productivity of any given racial discourse.
To examine these questions, I turn to the public discourse surrounding the events of
September 2007 and the trial of the six high school students from Jena, Louisiana who came to
be known as the “Jena Six.” Briefly, the Jena Six were six black, male high school students who
were convicted of assault on a white student that took place in November 2006 in the small,
predominately white, town of Jena. While their guilt in committing the crime was not in
question, public protest arose over the severity of the charges filed against them, especially in
light of events that had been escalating in Jena in the fall of 2006. After the sentence of one of
the defendants was announced in September 2007, Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson led a protest
march in Jena that was attended by several thousand people. That march received widespread
national media coverage, and in Chapter 4 I examine public statements that were made in
response to the march the day after it took place.
While I further contextualize the trial of the Jena Six and its subsequent protest march in
Chapter 3, I chose the Jena Six case, rather than a more recent high-profile and racially-charged
subject of mass public discourse, for two primary reasons that I discuss further in the next
section. First, unlike more contemporary instances of public racial discourse such as those
recently seen following several highly-publicized deaths of unarmed black men at the hands of
law enforcement, the events leading up to and resulting from the Jena Six, while complex and
unclear at times, are generally established and are not presently being debated. That is, the
answers needed to establish “what happened” are no longer a point of contention regarding the
Jena Six case, trial, and sentencing. Yet, the points of conflict that the public debated in 2006
regarding the Jena Six— having largely to do with the fairness of the sentences given to the six
defendants— are still being debated today, albeit under different circumstances. Debates over
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systemic racism and race-based disparities within the legal system are still present, and evidence
for such disparities is still seen. Furthermore, conceptions of black male lawlessness still play a
significant role in forming public perceptions of innocence and guilt. Second, while immediate
circumstances and causes for public protest have understandably changed, so too have the
methods, organization, and technologies used to participate in protests against racial
discrimination and disparity. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, I believe the Jena Six trial and
protests mark the end of an era for a particular kind of protest, as rapid social and technological
developments soon after the trial quickly transformed the nature of subsequent public responses
even as the color-blind constraints on the productivity of discourse remain the same.
Crime and Public Perception
At the center of the debate surrounding the prosecution of the Jena Six was a significant
critique of the seeming unfairness of the legal charges brought against the Six, including the role
of the Six’s race in conjunction with their gender in the media coverage and public discourse
regarding their case. It is within this public discourse that I am interested in considering the
above-mentioned concerns of color-blind racism and color-blind language, yet because of the
role that the seemingly racial nature of the case played in bringing national attention to the Jena
Six, it is important to understand the legal precedent and stakes of the Jena Six trial. Despite the
social progress made by the end of Jim Crow-era laws and the successes of the Civil Rights
movement, racism and racial discrimination and inequality in a number of arenas did not
immediately resolve itself with the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s. Instead, as I
will further discuss in Chapter 2, what emerged was a subtler method and vocabulary for the
perpetuation of racist attitudes and beliefs— a method and system of racial logic that became
known as color-blind racism. While the language may have changed since the advent of civil
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rights legislation, it is important to note that in many ways, especially within the legal system,
significant racial disparities still remain.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) notes that at every stage in the criminal
justice system— from initial stops and searches in public and in homes to sentencing in courts—
racial disparities are present and perpetuated,1 resulting in longer sentences and higher
incarceration rates for defendants of color. These disparities are often seen in two major areas of
legal jurisdiction: drug crime and violent crime.
Racial Disparities in Drug Crime Enforcement
The civil rights advocacy group Human Rights Watch noted in 2000 that in seven states
black defendants made up 80 to 90 percent of incarcerated drug offenders, despite the fact that
rates of drug distribution and use were generally similar across all races and ethnicities in the
US.2 Indeed, out of any ethnic or racial group, white youth were in fact the most likely to be
guilty of drug possession or sales. As a study also published in 2000 by the National Institute on
Drug Abuse found, white students used cocaine eight times as often as black students, and used
heroin seven times as often. 3 However, despite not making up the majority of people found
guilty of drug possession or distribution, in 2006— the same year as the events in Jena— 1 in 14
black men, and 1 in 9 black men between ages twenty-five and thirty-five, were incarcerated,
compared to 1 in 106 white men.4 Furthermore, sentences given to black males within the federal
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Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color
Blindness, Revised (New York: The New Press, 2011), 98-99.
3

Ibid., 99.

4

Ibid., 100.
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court system are on average 20 percent longer than those received by white defendants who have
been convicted of similar crimes, 5 resulting largely from mandatory minimum sentencing for
drug convictions in many states, despite the fact that the racial makeup of drug use rates does not
correspond to the racial makeup of drug use conviction and incarceration.6
Race and Violent Crime
Additionally, despite homicide and other violent crime victimization between 1980 and
2011 decreasing among all races, 7 there has been both a disproportional increase in rates of
incarceration and a continued public belief in increased violent crime, and the disproportional
incarceration of black males is often justified as being the result of higher violent crime rates
within the black community and among black men.8 However, these high incarceration rates
seem to be the result of ineffective and disparate drug violation laws and policies rather than due
to a significant increase in acts of violent crime. On the one hand, homicide and violent crime
convictions are responsible for a very small percentage of overall prison populations, and the
same is true for more recent increases in incarceration rates. While homicide offenders made up
0.4 percent of population growth within the federal prison system between 2000 and 2011,
almost 61 percent of population growth could be attributed to drug offenses, and as of 2009
violent crime offenders made up only 7.9 of the federal prison population.9 On the other hand,
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despite an overall downward trend in violent crime rates, in 2009 blacks were 78 percent more
likely to be victims of household burglary than members of other races, and in 2012 were 66
percent more likely than whites to be victims of assault and robbery.
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Yet, despite their much

lower chances of being victimized, 73 percent of white respondents in a 2000 survey said that
courts did not deal harshly enough with criminals and that punitive measures within the criminal
justice system should be increased, compared to 64 percent of black respondents who answered
the same, and 58 percent of blacks who said in a 2001 survey that “more money for education
and job training” was their preferred crime reduction policy. 11
Perceptions of Black Criminality
What becomes apparent, then, is not only a disproportionate rate of incarceration
compared to offense rates of black defendants, but also a division between perceived and actual
levels of criminal activity. While certain types of crime are committed are higher rates by people
of color, white respondents in 2010 consistently over-estimated the rates at which they believed
blacks and Latinos committed those crimes.12 In contrast, when asked similar questions
regarding the racial distribution of perpetrators of certain crimes, black respondents in a 2000
study answered that they believed crimes were committed at approximately the same rate by
white, black, and Latino groups, suggesting that whites participated in “racial typification” much
more strongly than people of color.13 Such findings correlate strongly with studies performed to
examine implicit bias, such as the 1995 study that found that 95 percent of participants imagined
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a stereotypical drug user as being black, despite the fact that in 1995 only 15 percent of drug
users were African American. 14 Implicit bias against black innocence— and even the
construction of a “script” of black criminality and guilt— can also be seen in a 2000 study that
found that when asked to recall news coverage of a crime, 60 percent of viewers falsely recalled
that they had seen an image of the perpetrator when one had not been provided, and of those
viewers 70 percent claimed that the perpetrator in the image was black.15 Or, in another study
from 2001, where participants were shown images of white and black individuals holding either
a weapon or a non-threatening object and had to quickly decide whether or not to shoot the
person in the image, not only did participants consistently mistake images of black individuals as
holding weapons when they were not, but also mis-identified white individuals as holding a
harmless object when they were, in fact, armed.16 Such mistakes demonstrate internalized,
unspoken assumptions about the rates and nature of black criminality, and play a significant role
not only in the conviction and sentencing of black defendants, but also in the public’s
perceptions and attitudes towards black defendants.
Similar public expressions of internal belief and perception were present in the discourse
surrounding the Jena Six, and continue today; yet, as I will show in the next section, the nature of
protest since Jena has changed considerably, thus I believe the Jena Six case provides an ideal
moment for critical examination of the racial logic and language that was at play in the public’s
discourse during the case and trial in 2006 and 2007. The trial and sentencing of the Jena Six
remains relevant today, as the issues that were raised by protesters in 2007 are the same as those
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still being raised: the concrete disparities that exist in the trial and sentencing of black
defendants, and expectations and assumptions about black male criminality. As I will discuss, the
guilt of the Jena Six was not in question in the case; rather, the point of public debate focused
largely around the six students’ intentions and the severity of their actions, and such assumptions
utilized previously-held understandings and assumptions about the nature of young, black males.
The Jena Six are worth examining, then, because while their case took place under very different
circumstances, recent attention given to several high-profile deaths of black men at the hands of
law enforcement suggests that presuppositions and unspoken “understandings” about black male
criminality still come with real, and even fatal, consequences.
Contemporary Parallels
Technological Changes
While I further detail the events surrounding the Jena Six later in Chapter 3, it is helpful
to consider the technological and social changes that were happening at the same time as the Jena
Six events, as they are the very changes that I examine in Chapter 5 in a discussion of how
technology and social networks have altered public racial discourse. Even though such changes
began around 2006, by 2013 and beyond I believe they fundamentally altered the stakes and
nature of public protest and discourse. First, the social networking site Twitter launched in
March 2006, and in September 2006 Facebook expanded its membership to allow anyone over
the age of thirteen to join, whereas prior to that date only individuals with valid .edu email
addresses could create an account. Although the growth of social media may appear unrelated to
both the Jena Six and the questions of racial discourse, in recent years social media sharing sites
such as Twitter and Facebook have come to play major roles as both organizational tools for
activism and protest, and sites of activism and protest, as can be seen in the now-familiar signal
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of racial solidarity #BlackLivesMatter.
The hashtag #BlackLivesMatter was first used on Facebook in July 2013 following the
acquittal of George Zimmerman for his fatal shooting of the black teenager Trayvon Martin.
Since then, it has been more widely used on Twitter, and in Twitter’s 10-year history
#BlackLivesMatter has become its third most-popular hashtag.17 While it was not widely popular
when it appeared on Facebook in reference to Zimmerman’s acquittal, the hashtag and the
subsequent Black Lives Matter movement quickly grew in visibility in August 2014 after the
fatal shooting of the black 18 year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri at the hands of a
white police officer. In the three weeks following Brown’s death, #BlackLivesMatter appeared
online an average of 58,747 times per day, and its used spiked again on November 25, 2014
when a jury decided not to indict Brown’s shooter; the hashtag appeared 172,772 times on the
25th, and in the next three weeks it was used 1.7 million times. 18
Looking at a period from July 2013 to March 2016, 38% of uses of #BlackLivesMatter
has been directly positive or supportive of the Black Lives Matter movement, while another 12%
has been neutral, 11% has been critical of the movement, and 39% has been found in statements
that deal with race issues but not Black Lives Matter in particular.19 That is to say, use of
#BlackLivesMatter since its first appearance on Twitter has not necessarily always been done
with activist intentions. Yet, since its emergence it has become part of the public consciousness
and conversations about race— with 11.8 million uses on Twitter between July 2013 and March

Monica Anderson and Paul Hitlin, “Social Media Conversations About Race” (Pew
Research Center, August 15, 2016), 14.
17
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Ibid., 16-17.
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Ibid., 18.
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201620— and it is difficult to examine or discuss racial activism or protest in the contemporary
moment without encountering mentions of, and arguments for and against, the message and
efficacy of #BlackLivesMatter.21
The history of social media, and in particular “hashtag activism” efforts— in which
coordinated hashtags on social media sites are used to express solidarity with a particular “real
world” cause— such as #BlackLivesMatter, is important to note in relation to the history of the
Jena Six case. While the debates and protests that surrounded the Jena Six have many similarities
to more recent cases of seeming disparity and unequal treatment of young black men at the hands
of law enforcement and the legal system— including what I would argue are similar color-blind
ideological roots— they differ widely in the ways that the general public responded and voiced
opinions, opposition, and support. Namely, I argue that while the protests that took place in
September 2007 in Jena in support of the Jena Six stood as one of many in a long history of
protests where people, led by one or two prominent leaders, physically gathered in one location
and relied on media presence to gain national attention, the protests in Jena also marked the end
of those kinds of protests. After Jena, rapid technological changes— namely, the rise in the
popularity and use of social media and networking sites— would quickly and fundamentally
transform both the how and the who of public protest. No longer did a protest need to be
organized and led by one message-setting leader, nor did participants need to be physically
present to express solidarity. Instead, with the advent of Twitter and a more-public Facebook in

20
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It should be noted, incidentally, that Twitter hashtags— or words and phrases that are
labeled through the use of a hash or pound sign [#]— were not linked to send users to a search
result of all uses of a particular hashtag until 2009, and thus early users were limited in their
ability to see other users and tweets using the same tag.
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the same year as the events of the Jena Six, I suspect that had the Jena Six trial taken place a year
or two later, its protests and public involvement would have looked much more like the discourse
that surrounded the deaths of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, and subsequent others.
Generational Shifts
An additional distinction that should be made in order to understand the significance of
the differences between the Jena Six and more recent public activism is that of both the nature of
the leadership and the individuals appearing as the public “face” of public protests. As I argued
above, the emergence of mobile social media and networking tools made it easier for people to
discover and become involved in protesting on behalf of various issues. With this ease of access,
demonstrated in the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and related advocacy
organizations, the model of leadership for public demonstrations shifted from a single and
identifiable representative to a decentralized and grassroots style of organization, with
participants tending to be younger, anti-establishment, and not seeking to establish a visible,
solitary representative to speak on behalf of the entire movement. 22
As I will discuss, Al Sharpton is an individual who stands as perhaps the most easilyidentifiable leader of older, more traditional models of protest and activism. He is noteworthy
because while he organized the march in Jena in 2007, he also stands at the forefront of conflicts
today between older and younger generations of activists who are debating how movements like
Black Lives Matter will be led in the future. Although Sharpton has remained a figure of much
debate and criticism throughout his career— which I discuss further in Chapter 4— he gained
prominence organizing protests, marches, and rallies against specific instances of racial violence

Matt Laslo, “Al Sharpton Is Struggling to Control the ‘Black Lives Matter’
Movement,” Vice, accessed February 28, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/al-sharptonis-struggling-to-control-the-black-lives-matter-movement-1218.
22
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and discrimination throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. 23 In December 2014, Sharpton’s civil
rights group, the National Action Network, organized a march in Washington DC named
“Sharpton’s Justice For All March” to protest the Ferguson jury’s decision to not indict the white
police officer who killed Michael Brown 24— a march that took place only weeks after the jury’s
decision, which, as noted above, had marked a significant surge in online use of
#BlackLivesMatter. While the December march attracted a sizable crowd, Sharpton’s presence
and intentions for the march were a point of contention as it was reported that a member of the
“Hand’s Up, Don’t Shoot!” activist group— closely related to Black Lives Matter, but coming
more immediately out of the death of Michael Brown— criticized the purpose of the march,
saying “I thought there was going to be actions, not a show. This is a show.”25 The central
critique from younger members of newer organizations such as Black Lives Matter towards
people like Sharpton and others from his era, it seemed, was the sense of his being “co-opted by
the government and the administration and his position in terms of big commercial media,” 26
which had been seen as a hindrance to more effective grassroots and independent activism and
organization. Describing younger activists’ goals for the 2014 protest, Andy Stepanian, organizer
of the progressive activism group Hands Up United, argued that “the demonstrations that are
happening from coast to coast are largely organized by young people of color and young folks
that have adopted an intersectional message of liberation… There is a changing of the guard

Grace Wyler, “The Mainstreaming of Al Sharpton,” Vice, May 11, 2014,
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/the-many-mysteries-of-al-sharpton.
23
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that’s happening in this country. They’re doing so organically without the help of groups like the
NAACP or Rainbow Push Coalition [Jesse Jackson’s political activism organization] and
others.”27 In response to the suggestion that there was discord between older and younger
protesters at the march in 2014, Sharpton argued that “it’s [the accusation of disagreement] a lot
of side show that really at the end of the day doesn’t matter.”28 Nevertheless, with the evolution
of both the goals and methods of more recent activism and protest efforts— including the
increasing use of online and mobile networking, fundraising, and awareness-raising strategies—
compared to those seen only four or five years ago, it appears that the incoming generation of
political activists is bringing with it a fundamental shift in the messages, goals, and public
leadership of groups and organizations fighting for civil rights and racial equality.
Why the Jena Six?
The Jena Six trial and subsequent commentary and protests, then, provide an opportune
moment to examine the discourse that surrounds moments of racialized public conflict and
debate. While the texts that I use are from members of the general public, rather than from
individuals immediately involved in the events at Jena, I believe they are worth examining since
they were made in response to a form of political activism and protest that I believe will continue
to look less familiar as activism such as that seen in the de-centralized, grassroots protests in
2014, the rise of #BlackLivesMatter, and the presence of other online and social media-driven
efforts continue to grow. At the heart of the protests, though— from the injustices handed down
to the Jena Six through their sentencing to the death of Martin, Brown, and others— the issues at
stake remain fundamentally the same.
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It is this continuation of racial inequality— despite changes in methods, people, policies,
and aims— that I will explore in this project. I seek to answer two central questions: What is the
language used to talk about and respond to instances of racialized conflict— that is, instances
where there is significant public debate and where race is seen as a central factor in the initial
event— and how does that language work to transform or maintain current racial conditions in
the United States?
Outline of Research
To answer those questions, the paper that follows focuses attention on a speech analysis
of four calls made to the September 21, 2007 broadcast of the C-SPAN morning news program,
“Washington Journal,” in which four different callers provide their thoughts on the issues
surrounding the students known as the Jena Six.
Chapter 2 will review the philosophical, racial, and methodological theories and
principles that inform the work, as I attempt to answer the question of how language is used to
maintain and/or challenge current racial conditions, although I conclude that the current system
of racial language maintains much more than it challenges. I begin with Booth’s examination of
language and value in light of the constructed and artificial nature of racial categories, suggesting
that such categories— following the groundwork laid by Bonilla-Silva—are used to construct
and maintain unequal racial hierarchies. I then turn to explore Bonilla-Silva’s conception of
color-blind language in light of Shotwell’s theorization of “implicit knowledge” and Bourdieu’s
habitus/doxa/field sequence to suggest that the notion of “common sense” is useful for
understanding how racial hierarchies are made implicit and unidentifiable, and I identify BonillaSilva’s color-blind racial system as an instance of Bourdieu’s habitus in action. Connecting the
role of implicit evaluation to the communication of racial attitudes through color-blind language,
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I conclude Chapter 2 with a discussion of the expression of racial attitudes through speakers’
stancetaking and alignment in discourse.
In Chapter 3 I contextualize the immediate circumstances of the Jena Six case, and detail
the methodology employed to conduct the analyses, which I summarize into five “Rules of
Color-Blind Language,” drawing from Bonilla-Silva’s categories of color-blind language. These
rules, I will argue, play a central role in organizing the language that facilitates color-blind
racism and the continuance of the current racial system.
Next, in Chapter 4 I conduct my analysis of the four calls in light of the five rules,
focusing largely on their use of color-blind language to take evaluative stances and express racial
attitudes that are indicative of, and generally expected from, the conceptual frameworks of race
that dominate contemporary racial thought and logic, although I will note some significant
exceptions to the boundaries set by color-blind language.
Chapter 5 concludes my research, where I will discuss major conclusions, limitations,
and implications drawn from the analyses performed in the preceding chapter. After looking at
how the discourse surrounding the Jena Six pertains to comparable discourse today, I compare
the ways that each caller from Chapter 4 utilizes color-blind language to evaluate a racial subject
and offer some potential means for moving beyond the current system of racial discourse— a
move which would, I believe, ultimately result in a move beyond current understandings of racial
identity categories.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Only in imaginary experience…which neutralizes the sense of
social realities, does the social world take the form of a universe of
possibles equally possible for any possible subject. Agents shape
their aspirations according to concrete indices of the accessible and
the inaccessible, of what is and is not ‘for us,’ a division as
fundamental and as fundamentally recognized as that between the
sacred and the profane. The pre-emptive rights on the future that
are defined by law and by the monopolistic right to certain
possibilities that it confers are merely the explicitly guaranteed
form of the whole set of appropriated chances through which the
power relations of the present project themselves into the future
from where they govern present dispositions, especially those
towards the future.
—Pierre Bourdieu

In this chapter, I examine the philosophical and rhetorical foundations of current racial
structures and discourse in the United States. Starting with the historical origins of race as a
meaningful—yet arbitrarily constructed— identity category, I move to examine the ways in
which color-blind language creates and maintains color-blind logic in the United States. Such
logic, I argue, is dependent upon shared knowledge or what I call “common sense.” Using
Bonilla-Silva’s conception of color-blind language, I theorize it in light of Bourdieu’s schema of
habitus, field, and doxa. Finally, I move to examine stancetaking as a rhetorical and evaluative
act that can be used as a strategy for the expression of racial attitudes while following the “rules”
of color-blind language, which informs the methodologies and aims that will be employed in
chapters three and four.
Symbolic Language and Value
I turn first to Booth’s examination of assent and the ways in which people come to have
“good reasons” for changing their minds. Booth is critical of those who say that good reasons
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can only come from objective, value-free judgement, as he argues that much of the rationale that
is employed on any subject is the result of, essentially, a collective or group-made “best guess.”
As I will show, however, I take issue with Booth’s reliance on the tendencies of collective
decision-making when dealing with matters that cannot, by their nature, be dealt with
objectively, and by extension the ways in which collective values self-reinforce their own
stability regardless of social acceptability or desirability.
Booth examines symbolic language in order to draw out the ways in which, and reasons
why, people assent to information, have “good reasons,” or change their minds, especially in
instances where the information in question is not objective or able to be quantified as “true.”
Furthermore, Booth suggests that in communication it is impossible to separate a word’s
symbolic usage from some degree of intention to assert value. To the degree that language is
representing a thing or concept that is not necessarily materially present, Booth claims that
symbolic language is used with the intent “‘to call to mind’ and thus place some sort of value on
what is not materially present.”29 This calling to mind, he says, is reliant upon the listener’s
deferral to the speaker’s image of what is being referred to, and therefore such language comes
with “an implicit ‘ought,’” as if to say that the listener “ought” to assent to the speaker’s
perception and naming of the symbolically-represented thing. 30
While I agree with Booth’s critique of those who would say that good reasons can only
result from value-free judgments, as well as his conclusions regarding language as an
unavoidable vehicle for the transmission of value, Booth sidesteps the role of social forces in the
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construction of “common knowledge” or collective social knowledge. Booth is wary of those
who assign all results of decision making to the influence of “social structures,” perhaps with
good reason in attempts to preserve individual autonomy. But, in arguing for a “philosophy of
good reasons, a way of discovering how motives become reasons and a way of showing how
what we call ideas sometimes can and should affect our choices,” 31 he neglects the instances in
which those good reasons and ideals that in turn affect our choices are— put simply— wrong.
Furthermore, in his disdain for over-reliance on explaining everything as being the result of a
“system,” he avoids acknowledging the social structures and systems that do stabilize, shape, and
maintain current social and ideological conditions— in the case of this project, conditions that
are reliant upon the continuous exploitation of the collectively-accepted untruths that maintain
color-blind racism and racial disparity in the United States.
To reach the systemic untruth that I am concerned with in this project— namely, the use
of color-blind language to perpetuate race as a meaningful category of (mis)identification— I
turn next to the history of race as a linguistic construct and the function that racial language has
served in the United States, before looking at such language in light of Bourdieu’s
conceptualization of social structures and the ways that individuals exist and act within them.
Bourdieu’s description of social structures, when applied to Bonilla-Silva’s elaboration on colorblind language as a means for perpetuating false conceptions of racial categories and identity,
offers an alternative to Booth’s understanding of how and why knowledge and social systems are
formed— an alternative in which the “rules” that govern the perpetuation of such systems can be
identified and challenged.
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Race as Linguistic Construct
It is crucial to note that the very basis upon which racial identity categories are made is at
once entirely arbitrary yet not without real social effects. That is to say, while the inequalities
and lived experiences that are involuntarily bestowed upon an individual because of their racial
identity are real— and in many instances painfully so— the very concept of race as a point upon
which real human differences can be made, as well as the perceived significance of those
differences, is a fiction. Indeed, following sociologists and race historians Omi and Winant’s
definition, “race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by
referring to different types of human bodies.”32 That fiction serves a real purpose: namely, the
perpetuation of dominating systems. But, the significance of the biological, and later cultural,
measures upon which those distinctions have been made have no real basis in scientific or social
fact.
Historical Constructions of Race
While cultural and ethnic distinctions have been well-established as meaningful
categories of identification, race as an identifying marker is a relatively recent invention with no
biological or physiological basis. Ethnic groups can be defined by such markers as “common
language, geographic locale or place or origin, religion, sense of history, traditions, values,
beliefs, food habits, and so forth,” and often such distinctions are self-identified as constituting a
discrete group identity.33 Race as an identifying factor, however, did not emerge until the late
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1700s when, as Ashcroft notes, rather than being used to distinguish between specific groups of
“persons or things,” it “came to mean a distinct category of human beings with physical
characteristics transmitted by descent.”34 By 1764, when Immanuel Kant in his work
Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime used the German phrase for “races of
mankind,” there was an established “vocabulary of discrimination” based on the ideology of
chromatism, in which external physical characteristics had a “direct causal” link to a group’s
internal dispositions and mental strength.35 As Omi and Winant note, during the 18th and 19th
centuries, leading theories of racial difference relied on the belief that visible markers such as
skin color or facial features served as markers of internal differences in “[t]emperament,
sexuality, intelligence, athletic ability, aesthetic preferences and so on.”36 The taxonomies of
chromatism were largely reliant on skin color, and by the 19th century color was the
“unquestioned sign” of a person’s internal qualities and abilities, even though the basis for color
judgments— and the language used to make such judgments— was entirely arbitrary and
subjective.37 Many scholars ascribe the rise of “race” as a category to the need for Africans— as
well as other colonized groups— to be thought of as sub-human in order to justify widespread
slavery and European expansion in the 1700s and 1800s, 38 as “race” in its current meaning had
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not been deployed prior to that historical point.39 Furthermore, while “black” as an identifying
category was employed to justify oppression, “whiteness” originated in the pre-American
Revolution colonies as wealthy landowners attempted to deter rebellion and overthrow at the
hands of their tenant farmers. As Buck argues, by giving certain poor laborers a perceived
advantage— namely, the identity of “whiteness” versus being raced as “black”— over the
equally poor “black” laborers, non-whites, rather than the wealthy, became the enemy of the
white poor.40 Despite the multiple functions of the category of race, it began, and remains, rooted
in its social utility rather than reflecting a real biological difference.
By the 18th century, academic circles began to slowly shift away from thinking of race in
terms of biological difference, and towards it being acknowledged as a social construct, which is
the view taken in this paper.41 Among the wider general public however, race shifted to signify
not “human biogenetic variation,” but rather the idea that physical features depicted inner
behaviors and characteristics. 42 As the next section will discuss, the shift towards external racial
features signaling internal— and generally negative— characteristics falls neatly in line with the
functions of color-blind racism, in which race itself is never directly discussed, but rather
meaning-laden terms are used to signal perceived flaws or inferiorities.
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Durability and Artificiality of Race
Because of its historical origins and uses, as well as the ways in which its uses have
evolved into the present era, race remains a category of identity that is ultimately grounded in
arbitrary markers. Furthermore, unlike ethnicity— which is flexible and can be transmitted—
racial identities are defined by rigid markers in which a person cannot be less than entirely one
race, nor can an individual demographically change their race. 43 Smedley and Smedley argue
that the inflexible “rules” of racial identity result in racial categorization not only falsely
exaggerating the degree of difference that racial identity signifies, but also in relying on the
belief that such differences are permanent and immutable. 44
Thus, despite the artificial significance of racial categories, as well as the arbitrary basis
on which a person’s racial identity is classified, such categories are not without real and
significant consequences, and it has been widely argued that it is these real consequences of
racial identity that have supported its continued existence as a category of identification. As
Ashcroft notes, “[l]anguage…exists as much to conceal as to signify. The language of interracial relations is a demonstration of the importance of use in meaning. Whatever admirable
relations such terminology signifies, the use of such language can be a way of embedding racist
attitudes. Indeed, the embedding of such attitudes is fundamental to the language of race itself.” 45
As I discuss next, the racial structure of the United States is supported by, and indeed relies
upon, specific rhetorical and semantic tactics— termed color-blind language— in order to
continue without question, and indeed without knowledge of its existence.
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Language and Race
Color-Blind Racism
Bonilla-Silva, in his work Racism without Racists, sees what he terms color-blind
language46 as the means through which the ideology and system of white privilege are
perpetuated. Although I will later attend to his conceptions of white privilege’s relationship to
racial structure and racial ideology, particularly in relation to Bourdieu’s work, in this section I
address the definition and function of color-blind language in maintaining current racial
structures. For Bonilla-Silva, contemporary racial attitudes persist— like his title suggests—
without the presence of the overt “racists” of the pre-Civil Rights era.47 That is, as strategies for
maintenance of the racial hierarchy in the United States changed— without the hierarchy itself
changing— there was no longer a place for overt, legally-sanctioned Jim Crow-era racial
discrimination. What has replaced it, Bonilla-Silva argues, is “New Racism”— racial practices
that are “subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial,” summed up in idea of color-blind
racism. 48
First, however, it may be useful to briefly define the system of color-blind racism, first in
more theoretical terms, and then as it appears in contemporary and lived reality. Bonilla-Silva
calls color-blind racism “racism lite,” in which overt Jim Crow-style racial oppression and
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discrimination is exchanged for a more subtle— but no less effective— and unnamed
institutional racial hierarchy, which Bonilla-Silva sees as being employed in the service of
maintaining white privilege.49 While there is debate over whether or not a generalized white
privilege is the ultimate telos of color-blind racism, it is nevertheless an ongoing and real
socially-structuring system. By virtue of its structure, color-blind racism has racially-disparate
effects, yet at no point is there an identifiable individual who can be blamed or labeled as an
unquestionable “racist,” hence the lack of Racists in Bonilla-Silva’s examination of Racism.
Criminal justice scholars Van Cleve and Mayes note that with the historical turn away
from biology-based justifications for racism and the shift towards a belief in the cultural and
moral inferiority of non-white groups, racial discrimination or hostility was minimized as a
possible explanation for persistent racial inequality and disparity, and instead individualized
character and morality were highlighted as the primary determinant of a person’s success. 50 Such
attitudes towards the influence of a person’s racial identity has been deemed laissez-faire racism,
in which overt and active hostility and violence on the basis of race has been replaced by what
Van Cleve and Mayes call a passive “racism of convenience,” where the historically-grounded
structural systems of inequality are ignored— and in many cases denied— on the basis that Jim
Crow-era racism has been legislatively ended. Nevertheless, racialized disparities persist across a
number of social domains, including incarceration— as discussed in Chapter 1— and the areas
of “income, health, education, residential segregation, rates of surveillance and punishment, and
a myriad of other indicators that measure social and physical well-being,” and in many cases the
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rates within these categories have not significantly changed since the pre-Civil Rights era.51
While these disparities persist, the call of color-blindness to literally not see color results in
ongoing, systemic, and seemingly non-racial disparities; following the logic, if race or “color”
can no longer be a valid point of observation, then disparities that fall distinctly upon racial lines
cannot be identified as possibly racist.
One well-known public utilization of color-blind logic was the opinion offered by Chief
Justice John Roberts in the 2007 case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1. In the case, parents of students in a Seattle school district brought action under the
Equal Protection Clause against the district for reassigning students from overcrowded high
schools using students’ racial classification data.52 Because the district allowed families to
choose which high school their children could attend, the Seattle school system utilized a series
of “tiebreakers” to determine which students could attend especially popular schools, and
maintaining a certain ratio of white to non-white students in each school was a part of the tiebreaking process, which is to say that a student could be admitted or denied primarily on whether
or not their attendance would help or hinder the target ratio. Ultimately, the court ruled that the
districts’ taking students’ racial identities into consideration when determining which high
school they could attend was not sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to guarantee the maintaining of
racial diversity within all schools in the Seattle No. 1 district, and therefore the school district
could not use students’ race as the primary factor for school location assignments. Significant,
however, was Chief Justice Roberts’s final statement at the end of his majority opinion in favor
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of the parents, when he observed that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 53 In this brief statement, Chief Justice Roberts
summarized the heart of color-blind logic: ending race-based inequality or injustice is a matter of
declaring that the inequality or injustice at hand is not about race, and therefore cannot be racist.
It should be noted that under the logic employed by the Chief Justice, any decision that is
made based upon a person’s racial identity— regardless of the intentions behind, or outcome of,
that decision— is “discriminatory,” and therefore undesirable and socially discouraged. Of
course, as I will argue in the remainder of this chapter and through the rest of this project,
declaring something non-racial, or claiming to not “see color,” does not eliminate the ways that
negative and oppressive racial beliefs and attitudes are still present in social discourse and
ideology. I further contend that acknowledgement of, or acting upon the basis of, racial identities
should not be considered inherently discriminatory or racist. Indeed, color-blind racism relies in
part on a refusal to acknowledge the influence racial categories continue to have outside of
instances of overt racial violence and/or discrimination. This refusal is, in part, why color-blind
logic continues to be so widespread and unquestioningly accepted. With the aim of examining
how the color-blind system is communicated and perpetuated at the level of individuals, I return
to Bonilla-Silva’s conceptions of color-blind racism, and the ways in which it is built upon the
highly organized and stable system of color-blind language.
Color-blind racism, as Bonilla-Silva defines it, is that which “otherizes softly….without
naming those who it subjects and those who it rewards.”54 For instance, rather than ascribing the
social inequality of minorities to an inherent, biological servility or weakness, color-blind racism

53

Ibid.

54

Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists, 3-4.

27
places the responsibility for ongoing inequality on a personal lack of motivation or hard work, or
on cultural rather than biological determinants.55 For example, where people in the pre-Civil
Rights era objected to interracial marriage on a “straight racial” or moral basis, color-blind
racism allows for the continuance of such opposition, but with reasoning that must be grounded
in such fears as “concerns over the children.” 56 Bonilla-Silva identifies four specific rhetorical
tactics that people use when attempting to use color-blind language to express racialized beliefs,
but it is important to understand the invisible, unspoken way in which color-blind racism is
perpetuated by those who know its “codes” and tactics. 57
Bonilla-Silva identifies four “central frames” of color-blind racism which provide “set
paths for interpreting information”58 within the current post-Civil Rights racial system. These
frames— abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and minimization of racism— act
as consistent, albeit misrepresenting, interpretive lenses through which members of the dominant
group explain and understand “racial phenomena.” 59 One of the frames, abstract liberalism, is
significant in the role that it plays in the sources I examine in Chapter 4. Applying the frame of
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abstract liberalism involves invoking the values of liberalism on a theoretical basis, with the
intention of using the ideals and values as a way to justify racializing and/or discriminatory
practices, beliefs, and attitudes. By using traditional liberal ideals such as “individual liberty”
and “freedom from government interference” to justify opposing more immediate and practical
attempts to end the lived manifestations and instances of racial inequality or discrimination, 60
white individuals can claim the “moral” or “reasonable” path of racial strategy. At the same time,
they can avoid expressing an attitude towards race that will either a. be seen as socially
unacceptable within the rules of color-blind racism (which require such attitudes to remain
unspoken) or b. require a change in their current attitudes, beliefs, and/or behaviors in order to
enact what they (at least verbally) consider to be necessary changes on the road to racial equality.
Color-Blind Language
Looking at the specific linguistic and rhetorical strategies that Bonilla-Silva says white
speakers in the US use when “playing by the rules” of color-blind racism, I will examine the
ways in which individual speakers express racial attitudes, values, and beliefs. Historically, while
the Civil Rights movement “shattered…the United States’ norms about public discussions on
race,”61 it did not shatter the dominant ideology of white superiority, and consequently a new
way to talk about race was needed that “encoded” formerly-explicit negative attitudes towards
racial minorities. The strategies that resulted from this post-Civil Rights shift towards color-blind
racism will, collectively, be referred to as color-blind language, as they form a complete set of
“tools” from which white speakers can draw in order to express racial attitudes within the
framework and ideology (or what I will later define as the habitus) of white privilege.
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The four linguistic strategies that Bonilla-Silva observes white speakers using when
discussing matters of race include 1.) Use of rhetorical and semantic strategies to avoid talking
directly about race, 2.) Projection, 3.) Use of diminutives, and 4.) “Rhetorical incoherence” when
pushed to address “uncomfortable” racial issues. 62 The first strategy uses evasive “semantic
moves” such as “I’m not racist, but…” “I’m not black so I don’t know,” and comments such as
“X is the result of economics, not racism” to avoid directly talking about race and racial issues. 63
With this strategy, speakers utilize “rhetorical shields” such as denials of racial intent and claims
of misunderstanding or ignorance in order to create disclaimers that can be employed if
challenged on the grounds that they are being too racially explicit. 64 The second strategy,
projection, is employed through language that follows the “they are the racist ones” line of
reasoning. This strategy is found in phrases such as “I think [blacks] segregate themselves,” or
“blacks are more prejudiced against whites than whites are against blacks.” Bonilla-Silva says
that the use of such phrases demonstrates a lack of self-reflexivity on the part of white speakers,
since this strategy gives the white speaker the rhetorical means necessary to suggest that
minorities, rather than whites, are the ones with a “problem.” 65 The third strategy uses
diminutives in a variety of ways to “soften the blow” of racial language. So, instead of direct
racial language such as “I am against interracial marriage,” a diminutive such as “I am just a bit
concerned about the welfare of the children” can be used to hedge a racialized— and otherwise
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socially-unacceptable— attitude by couching it in seemingly non-racial, color-blind language.66
Finally, Bonilla-Silva observes that certain sensitive race-related topics consistently result in
white speakers descending into what he calls rhetorical incoherence. Such incoherence involves
lengthy pauses, repetition of words and phrases, digressions, and the abandonment of the
attempted statement altogether.67 While these “errors” all occur in natural speech, “the level of
incoherence increases noticeably when people discuss sensitive subjects. Because the new racial
climate in America forbids the open expression of racially based feelings, views, and positions,
when whites discuss issues that make them feel uncomfortable, they become almost
incomprehensible.”68 Some topics that Bonilla-Silva observes resulting in said incoherence
include personal relationships between whites and blacks, interracial marriage, and selfsegregation, and he suggests that because an individual’s response to questions on these topics
require overt answers about personal experiences with race, the act of even answering the
question seems “controversial” and outside the boundaries established by color-blindness. 69
While the previously-mentioned central frames—that is, abstract liberalism,
naturalization, cultural racism, and minimization of racism— serve as broad interpretive
frameworks that an individual can use in their construction of racial attitudes, the above four
rhetorical and semantic strategies provide more immediate ways for people to express and
maintain their racial— and race-based— attitudes and beliefs. Because the overarching system of
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color-blind racism requires that explicit racial language and attitudes not be directly stated, white
speakers utilize the strategies identified by Bonilla-Silva in order to express their beliefs about
race and racial issues while still following the unspoken rules of post-Civil Rights colorblindness, or what Bonilla-Silva calls “mythological nonracialism.” 70 The point at which
speakers’ responses “break down,” as it has been noted, is when they are asked to answer
questions that require overt racial language which, for a variety of reasons, speakers are unable
to “disguise” by using the other tactics of color-blind language. By using these linguistic and
rhetorical strategies to “mend racial fissures, to restore a color-blind image when whiteness seeps
through discursive cracks,”71 the frames of color-blind racism are made into “an impregnable yet
elastic wall that barricades whites from the United States’ racial reality.” 72
Color-Blind Language and Implicit Knowledge
In order to depict how color-blind language satisfactorily works to perpetuate and
function within the system of color-blindness, Bonilla-Silva discusses the roles that racial stories
play in color-blind racism. While Bonilla-Silva discusses their role more expansively, I want to
note the distinction he makes between racial testimonies and racial story lines. Racial stories are
those which “evince the social position of the narrators,” and Bonilla-Silva sees them as
frequently employed by white speakers to justify their particular racial views. 73 Racial
testimonies are the personal stories “in which the narrator is a central participant in the story or is
close to the characters in the story,” such as Bonilla-Silva’s example of “I didn’t get that job
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because of a black man.” These stories are frequently used by the narrator in attempts to
persuade or gain sympathy from the listener. 74 However, because the testimonies are
“often…understood and interpreted through the lens of more general racial narratives and
understandings about the world,” the anonymous and vague “black man” in the above example is
the product of a shared racial story line.75 While Bonilla-Silva identifies four major story lines
that are used in the post- Civil Rights era of color-blindness, what is significant about his concept
of story lines is that they are more ideological and vague than they are narrative and personal,
and they take on fable-like qualities in the way that they are widely known and often utilize what
Bonilla-Silva describes as an “of course” racial principle. 76 It is their fable-like or “of course”
quality that I believe makes them valuable for inclusion in the discussion on socially-shared
implicit knowledge and common sense that I discuss in the next section; in particular, I am
interested in how the absorption of racial story lines into the realm of common knowledge
guarantees the perpetuation of color-blind racism.
Before I turn to common sense and its relationship to color-blindness, however, there is
one such story line that will become relevant in Chapters 3 and 4—what legal scholar Katheryn
Russell has deemed the image of the criminalblackman, in which “the young Black man is the
symbol of American criminality…the symbolic pillager of all that is good and pure.”77
As Alexander notes, the criminalblackman plays a significant role in displays of
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implicit— or unconscious— bias, such as in studies that have indicated that jurors and law
enforcement officers “become increasingly harsh when an alleged criminal is darker and more
‘stereotypically black’; they are more lenient when the accused is lighter and appears more
stereotypically white.”78 Such biases cannot, as their name suggests, be conscious acts, but they
rely upon a shared, generalized referent; namely, that of a vaguely threatening and almost
certainly criminal black male. Furthermore, as Bonilla-Silva states that story lines must be
impersonal, Russell argues that inherent to the criminalblackman image is the ability to
sweepingly apply the stereotype to any and all black males, and she notes that “[t]his
criminalblackman depiction permeates public and social institutions…Blacks, no matter what
their level of social status, can rise no higher than the prevailing deviant image.”79 The success of
the criminalblackman stereotype, then, relies less on being true than it does on being broadly
applied and accepted. It is important to note, however, that this stereotype is almost never
explicitly named. While its effects may be observed— such as through the presence of anti-black
implicit bias— references to the ever-present threat of the criminalblackman will almost always
be coded into non-racial language such as that seen in calls for “law and order,” or the late 1990s
news commentator who noted that “[i]t is unnecessary to speak directly of race because speaking
about crime is speaking about race.”80 Such coding, I believe Bonilla-Silva would concede, is
what allows these racial story lines to continue.
In the section that follows, then, I will first theorize the definition and function of
“common sense” as a way of understanding Bourdieu’s habitus/field schema, and briefly discuss
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ways to conceptualize Bourdieu’s habitus and field. Then, I consider what I have said about
Bonilla-Silva’s color-blind language in light of Bourdieu in order to examine how both are
dependent upon unspoken, yet collectively agreed-upon, “rules” for their survival, which are
perpetuated through the use of coded, yet value-laden, symbolic language.
Common Sense
To resolve the gap left in Booth’s conception of how social knowledge is formed,
Bourdieu’s work with, and linkage between, habitus, doxa, and field—which I define in the next
sections— provides a useful framework for attending to the limitations of what Shotwell terms
“implicit understanding,” or what can be understood as “common sense.”
Common sense, as I use it, is what I suspect Booth would consider to be the kind of
language one shares when— albeit unconsciously— one attempts to shape others through the
transmission of information. When value terms are put forward for a long enough time, and to a
wide enough audience, they become, I suggest, a matter of common sense— that is, knowledge
that is taken as unquestionably true or a “given.” Or, as Kristeva says quoting the French poet
Francis Ponge, “I speak and you hear me, therefore we are,”81 which is to say that matters of
socially-constructed value or beliefs become matters of common sense when they are made
unquestionable and essential to the construction of an ingroup/outgroup identity. As I suggested
in my discussion of the history of racial identity, such category-making is the implicit goal of
identifying and placing persons within the constructed categories of race. Yet, both the goals and
the means of racial identification—and subsequent placement into the racial hierarchy—are
rarely given attention or questioned. Following Gramsci’s conditions for what characterizes
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knowledge that becomes taken as a “given,” I define common sense as being necessarily: “[1]
incoherent and [2] inconsequential, [3] in conformity with the social and cultural position of
those masses whose philosophy it is.”82 While I further elaborate on Gramsci’s conditions in my
later discussion on the role of common sense in the formation of racial categories, it is important
to note here that in Gramsci’s conception, common sense, or knowledge that is a “given,” is
generally implicit and indistinct.
Yet, as I will argue, its nondescript nature does not mean that matters of common sense
are without consequence—only that they appear to be so. Recalling Booth, the trouble with
common sense that Shotwell draws attention to is that “[f]or common sense to be uncritically
absorbed is for it to enter our consciousness un-interrogated, at a level beneath notice. Part of the
difficulty, then, in any attempt to critically absorb common sense…might be that the very nature
of common sense resists a critical view…[f]or something to be coherent and voiced is for it to no
longer be commonsensical.”83 Furthermore, when Gramsci deems common sense as being “in
conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses,” it is, as Shotwell points out,
creating a cycle “in which common sense conforms to the conceptions of most everyone and in
turn shapes taken-for-granted understanding.”84 This cycle, as I will argue, is present at a
theoretical level in Bourdieu’s habitus/field conception, but can also be seen more concretely in
Bonilla-Silva’s analysis of the role of color-blind language in contemporary society: common
sense understandings of race and racial significance are, in fact, not inherent or natural, yet by
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appearing so they continue to shape and confirm generally-held attitudes about the role of a
person’s racial identity. The inability to name these matters of common sense and implicit
understanding is consequential for two reasons: on the one hand, common sense is used as a way
to make sense of and organize our experiences, and on the other it is unavailable for examination
and potential critique. As Shotwell explains, implicit understanding “names our background
taken-for-granted understanding of being in the world: The implicit is what provides the
conditions for things to make sense to us. The implicit provides the framework through which it
is possible to form propositions and also to evaluate them as true or false, and is thus
instrumentally important.”85
Bourdieu’s Habitus
Shotwell refers to Bourdieu’s habitus86 as one of the potential sites of origination and
subsequent storage for implicit knowledge or common sense, calling Bourdieu’s habitus “a
matrix of implicitly carried and transmitted understandings [that] articulate a link between
embodied understanding and the creation of certain common senses…[the habitus] persists over
time, and can be deployed outside the context of its production.” 87 Furthermore, Bourdieu’s
habitus is able “to perpetuate the mode of attention and interaction it manifests,” 88 as he defines a
habitus as an arrangement of understanding that is durable in its ability to persist over time—not
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limited to one particular temporal moment—and is transposable in that it can serve the individual
across a range of purpose, acting as a holistic organizing framework among a variety of “theatres
of social action.”89
For Bourdieu, habitus are systems of knowledge and frameworks for understanding and
interpretation that are able to organize an individual’s experiences and perceptions. That is, they
are simultaneously structured in their origin, structures in their organization, and structuring in
their function.90 Bourdieu’s habitus also explains the means by which on the one hand “social
facts become internalized,” and on the other hand the way in which “the personal comes to play a
role in the social.”91 In this sense, the habitus blurs the line between subject and object, as it is
further removed from critique (through internalization) and reinforced in durability (through
social objectification). At the same time, the habitus abides by purposeful, but non-explicit,
construction, as Bourdieu describes the habitus as “objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without
being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without
being the product of the organizing actions of a conductor.”92 In Bourdieu’s view, implicit
knowledge never originates from its carrier; rather, its survival is dependent upon being at once
part of, and a contributor to, a larger, unseen schema of organization. Indeed, Shotwell argues
that “[a] key aspect of…the habitus as embodied is the notion that it is transmitted implicitly
through a pedagogy that encodes practices in the body, thus rendering the practices it teaches
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significantly inaccessible.” 93 The habitus finds expression through practice, and for Bourdieu the
evidence of a habitus, rather than coming from seeing the habitus itself, is found in the resulting
practices and beliefs that arise from it. 94
Bourdieu’s Field
To possess such a habitus, and therefore carry the implicit knowledge that constitutes it,
is to exist in what Bourdieu calls a field. Put simply, the field is the “social space” in which the
habitus— as embodied by the individual— is formed, interacts, and transacts.95 Or, more
comprehensively, it is what Shotwell describes as “the objectified external history that
corresponds to the incorporated history of the habitus.”96 Furthermore, each field follows “its
own internal logics, rules and regularities,” 97 which means that “[t]he field generates commonly
held expectations and molds what counts as reasonable within it.”98 The “rules” of the field are
present but inaccessible, and consist only of a logic that ensures its own survival or what
Bourdieu calls a type of “objective consensus.”99 That is, a field’s rules becomes essentialized or
subsumed into implicit, “given” understanding— the dark side, if you will, of Booth’s
aforementioned collective understanding. Subsequently, “[w]hat is essential goes without saying
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because it comes without saying,”100 and what begins as a communication or expression of value
becomes a principle that is applied without formulation or question 101— such a principle is what
I call a matter of “common sense,” and stands as the larger arena within which individual habitus
can exist, communicate, and perpetuate.
For Bourdieu, to investigate or explore a particular field is to not only examine where the
object of study is located in terms of “specific historical and local/national/international and
relational context,” but it is “also [to] interrogate[] the ways in which previous knowledge about
the object under investigation had been generated, by whom, and whose interests were served by
those knowledge-generation practices.”102 As it will be demonstrated, Bourdieu’s conceptions of
habitus and field act as a conducive schema for examining the role of language in the expression
and perpetuation of particular attitudes towards race and racialized issues. More specifically, in
conjunction with Bonilla-Silva’s presentation of color-blind language, Bourdieu’s habitus and
field provide a productive basis on which to theorize the role that common sense plays in the
formation and maintenance or racial beliefs and attitudes, as well as how individual beliefs and
attitudes are shared through stancetaking.
Doxa is the term Bourdieu uses to describe the ongoing process by which the habitus
exists within the field— doxa, in this sense, standing as the “commitment to the
presuppositions”103 or “pre-verbal taking-for-granted”104 that must happen in order for the
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habitus (i.e.- the individual) to have a place in the field (i.e.- the larger historical system). 105
Doxa deals in large part with the process by which arbitrary difference is subsumed into a matter
of natural fact, shaped primarily through experience that the host field deems “natural.” 106 As
Shotwell notes, “[t]he formation of commonsense, self-perpetuating habitus in the form of
doxa— that which goes without saying and therefore produces misrecognition— is thus
unavailable for critical inquiry.” 107 In order for matters of common sense to continue as matters
of unquestioned and shared understanding that are communicated as “a given,” they must also
remain tacit. Thus, a potential critique of the premises that form a matter of “common sense” is
restricted, as is the construction of new understanding, or potentially even more liberatory modes
of discourse and understanding. As it will be shown, by keeping racial logic in the realm of the
unspoken and implicit, Bonilla-Silva’s color-blind system, and the color-blind language that
facilitates it, can continue without evaluation or critique. It is important to remember, though,
that per Bourdieu’s framework such avoidance of critique is not a convenient by-product of the
habitus; rather, the unspoken and unspeakable nature of the habitus is fundamental and essential
to its existence and survival.
Bourdieu and Racial Common Sense
I believe, then, that the color-blind system of racial organization is best understood in
light of Bourdieu’s conception of habitus and field, as it is reliant upon both a shared collective
knowledge of its structure and purpose, and a shared implicit understanding of the “rules” that
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must be abided by in order to maintain and perpetuate its operation.
In order for the organizing system of color-blind racism to continue in a way that
effectively maintains the assumed truth of white superiority, Bonilla-Says that a racial structure
is needed. Because, as previously mentioned, race is an arbitrary and socially-constructed
category of identification that nevertheless produces “real race effects,” Bonilla-Silva says that
racial structures are the “totality of the social relations and practices that reinforce white
privilege.”108 Recalling Bourdieu’s conception of the field that hosts and maintains a habitus,
Bonilla-Silva’s race structure acts as the “social space”109 and “objectified external history” 110
that allows the habitus of color-blind racism to continue. The race structure, for Bonilla-Silva, is
the set of unspoken or common sense “rules” that organize the overarching system of what race
is and how it “works” in the United States. As Bourdieu states, “[a]n institution…is complete
and fully viable only if it is durably objectified not only in things, that is, in the logic,
transcending individual agents, of a particular field, but also in bodies, in durable dispositions to
recognize and comply with the demands immanent in the field.”111 It is the race structure—
played out in the systemic yet real and embodied disparities between white and nonwhite
groups— that allows the institution of white supremacy in the current racial hierarchy to
transcend reliance upon individual actors and actions.
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Race and Common Sense
The ubiquitous and systematic racial logic that organizes racialized social hierarchies in
the United States is one that, in order for it to continue without question, must be implicitly
transmitted. Echoing the ways in which common sense cannot be explicitly identified if its logic
is to continue, to voice the logic of color-blindness is to bring it out of the domain of taken-forgranted and into the possibility of critique and potential discard. Within the common sense of
racial logic we can see, too, Gramsci’s characterization of information that is taken as a “given.”
First, Bonilla-Silva’s examination of the “rhetorical incoherence” that results when individuals
are pushed to answer questions that require direct racial language suggests that Gramsci’s first
condition of incoherence is fulfilled by speakers who, while otherwise able to function within the
system when not asked to explicitly discuss it, have a breakdown of internal logic when pushed
to face the natural conclusions of their racial beliefs. Second, Gramsci’s condition of
inconsequence is seen in both the use of abstract liberal ideals to justify racial beliefs, behaviors,
and attitudes, and in the rhetorical strategies of avoidance and use of diminutives, seen in phrases
such as “I’m not racist, but…” and “I disagree a little bit with affirmative action.” While the first
demonstration of inconsequence— abstract liberalism— minimizes the consequences of racism
by detaching the liberal value of, for instance, “fairness” from any obligation to enact concrete
change, the rhetorical and semantic strategies of avoidance and diminutive use perform
inconsequence by giving their speaker an “out” or a disclaimer from the accusation of direct
racist sentiment. Finally, Gramsci’s third condition— conformity with the position held by most
of the culture it exists within— is seen in the effect of color-blind racism itself. As Bonilla-Silva
notes, color-blind racism, both in “category and practice,” continues despite the arbitrary and
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damaging nature of “racial thinking” because it “benefit[s] members of the dominant race.” 112
Omi and Winant, too, examine the consequences of transforming racial structures into
matters of “common sense,” when they observe that “[e]verybody learns…some version, of the
rules of racial classification…often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcation….Race
becomes ‘common sense’— a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world.”113
Cached under collective, implicit knowledge, the current racial structure is neither
available for critique, nor is it one of multiple alternatives that may be chosen from. Instead, its
historical place in the domain of common sense acts as insulation from critical examination and
disruption.
The Habitus of Race
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, then, finds its parallel in Bonilla-Silva’s definition of
racial ideology: “the racially based frameworks used by actors to explain and justify…or
challenge…the racial status quo.”114 The habitus, in correspondence with Bonilla-Silva’s racial
ideology, is the filter through which racial attitudes are maintained by individuals within the field
of color-blind racism and racial hierarchy. For Bourdieu, the habitus acts as a sort of interpretive
matrix through which one interprets experiences in light of the past in order to ensure the past’s
survival into the future, as he notes that “[i]t ensures the active presence of past experiences,
which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend
to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all
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formal rules and explicit norms.”115 The unspoken nature of the racial structure of the United
States in this case, then, consistently shapes and influences the individual acting out of
participation within that racial hierarchy and ensures that, on the whole, the choices and beliefs
of individual actors will fit within the clearly-delineated, yet durable, “rules” of race. More
specifically, the durability of Bourdieu’s habitus seems akin to the flexibility offered by BonillaSilva’s central themes of race and his color-blind rhetorical strategies. Namely, the themes and
strategies allow the speaker to dodge self-reflexivity and awareness of their own complicity in
perpetuating racialized hierarchies, while at the same time giving them the ability to retreat to
disclaimers of ignorance and denial when faced with direct racial language or ideas that they are
unable to fit into the frameworks offered by color-blind language. Thus, at the levels of personal
linguistic usage and more theoretical interpretive practices, the habitus of color-blind racism is
often self-repairing: cultivating its own survival through both rhetorical and linguistic defensive
practices, and selectivity towards what it is willing to see. Such self-repair is observed by
Bourdieu when he notes that the habitus defends itself against critique and change “through the
selection it makes within new information by rejecting information capable of calling into
question its accumulated information, if exposed to it accidentally or by force, and especially by
avoiding exposure to such information.” 116 Because of its function as an interpretive filter for all
encounters with racial information and experiences, the color-blind habitus unconsciously
discards that which does not fit into its predetermined framework of the “rules” of race.
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Who Gets Served by the “Common Sense” of Racial Systems?
The common sense of race, then, is an organizing structure that is replete with highly
subjective and evaluative language which I will examine below, but it is important to first
acknowledge the significance of how it is communicated and learned. Through the historical
process of being classified under the realm of “given” knowledge that everybody just knows,
what is in fact a highly artificial hierarchy is given real, unquestioned— and unquestionable—
power, with real and continued effects and consequences. Furthermore, the present racial system
determines possible futures in a way that allows it to continue largely unaffected and able to
absorb challenges to its legitimacy, thus ensuring its own survival. While Bourdieu’s field can be
thought of as the larger, socio-historical level at which color-blindness is maintained, its role in
hosting individuals’ habitus gives it power over possible beliefs, attitudes, and actions that an
individual may take or attempt. Additionally, the implicit nature of the racial habitus, as I have
discussed, is not available for explicit identification. Furthermore, the habitus governs not only
an individual’s present interpretations and dispositions, but also their relationship to probable
outcomes and what is possible in the future. The habitus, ensuring its own survival, presents
possible futures and potentials where it is still maintained and surviving, yet it is in perpetual
contact with a person’s real, objective opportunities, actions, and choices. The common sense
that governs the racial structure of the United States is one that both guides the options that an
individual may choose from in the present, and also governs what kinds of “futures” are possible
for the system as a whole.117 Omi and Winant note that the continued presence of racial
ideology— including the racial myths and stereotypes that are by no means based in an essential,
objective reality— in the US suggests that its racial system is not only durable, but has become
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in a sense essential to the continued survival of the US social order, inseparable from American
identity itself. 118 The hierarchy of race in the United States, then, is left undisturbed because to
do so would disrupt the symbolic as well as real benefits that are given to the racial category of
whiteness, and the majority of the United States population is not only under no incentive to
disrupt such benefits.
Conclusions
While racial categories have a history of being constructed employed only to reinforce
inequality and domination, the racial organization system in the United States relies on implicit
shared knowledge in order to learn and understand how race “works.” At the same time, such
knowledge requires coded, symbolic language in order to be communicated while still keeping
up the unspoken and taken-for-granted nature of such information. What results, then, is a
language that is understood only by those who know— even if at an unconscious level— its
“code,” as well as the “true meanings” implied (but never directly stated) by the use of such
language. Color-blind racism is reliant upon the tacit nature of color-blind language as a way to
both guarantee its survival and continue to share racial judgments and evaluations that would
otherwise be unacceptable. Following Booth’s claim that all individuals utilize “symbolic
devices” through language in order to tacitly transmit judgment and evaluation with the intention
of unconsciously changing (or maintaining) people’s minds, I argue that the symbolic and coded
nature of color-blind language operates in a parallel way. While the structure of color-blind
racism must remain unspoken, color-blind language uses coded strategies, such as those
observed by Bonilla-Silva, in order to express meaning that is embedded with evaluative and
value-laden statements, with the intention of furthering the durability and domain of the current
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racial system.
In the final section of this chapter, I examine the theory behind the evaluative
stancetaking that will guide my analysis in Chapter 4. The use of color-blind language is,
consciously or not, expressing a judgment-laden statement of evaluation that is informed by the
totality of the current racial system, and I will attempt to show that current work in the domain of
positioning and stance theory provides a beneficial framework for understanding how, and to
what end, such language is employed at the level of interpersonal discourse.
Stancetaking in Color-Blind Language
As Bonilla-Silva notes as a caveat, the use of color-blind language criteria to clinically
delineate “bad racists” from “good non-racists” ignores the systemic forces and practices that
organize and maintain racial inequality in the United States119— inequality such as the racial
disparities within the legal system that I discussed in Chapter 1. That being said, color-blind
language is just one manifestation of color-blind racism, yet I believe it is important to consider
due to its position as the most immediate and direct way for an individual to participate in the
current racial system. Following the rules established by post-Civil Rights color-blindness,
explicit racial language is considered socially forbidden, yet color-blind language gives its users
a way to express racial sentiments without breaking the rules of social conventions. Because
racial attitudes and beliefs are seemingly no longer allowed to be explicitly stated, in this section
I will argue that stancetaking is a way that, in conjunction with the previously-discussed
rhetorical and semantic moves, allows speakers to make evaluative expressions regarding racial
topics. Stance-taking is seen as a rhetorical act of implied (and perhaps unconscious) attempted
persuasion, and while there are many reasons for why a speaker may or may not be successful at
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persuading their audience with their evaluative stance-giving expressions, I hope to demonstrate
why stance-taking should be seen as an additional element in the array of color-blind language
strategies.
What is Stance?
Stance— and more specifically the action of stancetaking— has been the object of
significant debate in attempts to define what it is, how to best study it, and how to evaluate its
parts under study. I rely largely on the definition offered by Keisanen, who terms the study of
stancetaking as “[t]he study of how people display affect, evaluation, or epistemic certainty (or
doubt) toward some state of affairs, [and] negotiate their points of view and alignment with each
other.”120
Before I discuss the process of stancetaking, it is important to understand the intended
recipient of a given stance act. Bell’s framework of audience design is helpful in understanding
the ways in which stancetaking responds to an “other.” Communication, he says, is largely in
response to other people. Yet, because not all communication takes place in the presence of an
immediately present audience, Bell provides a hierarchy of potential audiences that move away
from the speaker in both proximity and influence: the addressee, the auditor, the overhearer, and
the eavesdropper.121
The closest, the addressee, is known, acknowledged, and addressed by the speaker. The
auditor is known and acknowledged by the speaker, but not directly addressed. Overhearers are
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known, but neither acknowledged nor addressed, and finally, the presence of eavesdroppers
remains unknown to the speaker.122 Bell’s framework operates on a spectrum of relation to the
speaker— with the addressee being the most influential, and likely the closest in physical
proximity, while the overhearer and eavesdropper hold very little influence over the speaker’s
choices, and are likely not as close to the speaker as an addressee or auditor. 123 Thus, while the
“other” may be another physically or immediately-present individual or group— such as in a
personal conversation— I believe potential “others” should also include non-present individuals
or groups, and even abstract concepts and institutions, even as they hold decreasing amounts of
power over the speaker’s stancetaking strategies.
Put simply, stancetaking is the act of advancing an opinion, judgment, or evaluation that
is, to varying degrees, aligned (or not) with whomever a speaker is in discourse with, and an act
in which a speaker and their discourse partner(s) share the same object of evaluation.
Englebretson concludes that in analysis of stance, five “key conceptual principles” often emerge,
which I introduce here but will discuss in further detail in Chapter 3: First, a person’s stance is
often made on the level of either physical action or place, personal attitude or belief, social
morality or value, or a combination of the three. Second, stance is explicit and observable, and
thus open to review by others. Third, stancetaking is conversational and done in response to
other participants and stances. Fourth, stancetaking is indexical as it relies on sociocultural and
physical contexts. Fifth, stance is made in the context of, and can result in, real, concrete
consequences at both individual and institutional levels. 124 As I will further discuss in the next
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chapter as I describe my methodology, because stancetaking includes a broad range of evaluative
language, all five of Englebretson’s principles— stance occurring at multiple levels, as well as
being public and perceivable, interactional, indexical, and consequential— work in combination
to identify occurrences and objects of stancetaking.
Positioning Theory
Early conceptions of stance theory are found in the work done by Harré and van
Langenhove and what they call positioning theory. Seeing positioning— or the act of positiontaking— as a more “dynamic alternative to the more static concept of role,” 125 Harré and van
Langenhove describe positioning in terms of performance, in which speakers in a discourse are
given “fluid ‘parts’ or ‘roles’” that operate to “make a person’s actions intelligible and relatively
determinate as social acts.”126 While the “roles,” as well as the purposes or aims for positioning,
that are available to participants are much more narrowly-defined than necessary for
contemporary stance theory, Harré and van Langenhove’s early theorizations are compelling in
that rather than forwarding a stance, they see the evaluative moment-of-judgment that happens in
positioning as an embodied moral position. They acknowledge that not all speakers are given
equal voice, or even ability to take a position, which follows from their inclusion of identifiable
“roles”— such as that of teacher and student, or patient and caregiver— that are present in a
discourse. Rather, “[p]ositioning always takes place within the context of a specific moral order

Discourse: Subjectivity, Evaluation, Interaction (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing
Company, 2007), 6-7.
R. Harré and L. van Langenhove, “Introducing Positioning Theory,” in Positioning
Theory: Moral Contexts of Intentional Action, ed. Rom Harré and Luk van Langenhove (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 14.
125

126

Ibid., 17.

51
of speaking….In other words, the rights for self-positioning and other-positioning are unequally
distributed and not all situations allow for or call for an intentional positioning of the
participants.”127 As I will argue, stancetaking in the context of the color-blind racial structure is
available only to those who on the one hand understand the message implicit in seemingly nonracial color-blind language, and on the other hand are in a position within the racial hierarchy to
not be put at a disadvantage by its perpetuation.
Davies and Harré recognize that available discourse is the product of “an institutionalized
use of language and language-like sign systems. Institutionalization can occur at the disciplinary,
the political, the cultural and the small group level,”128 further elaborating on the ways in which
systems of social thought, such as the racial structure, are in a cyclical relationship with the
language they both give rise to and are reliant upon. Indeed, they note that once a speaker lays
claim to a certain stance or position, they “inevitably see[] the world from the vantage point of
that position and in terms of the particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts which are
made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned.” 129 The
language available for use in discourse, then, functions to not only describe but also prescribe,
and it limits possible future directions for not only communication but also lived experience and
reality, echoing Bourdieu’s habitus and field. Such communication, though, is reliant upon an
audience, and regardless of who or what that audience is or whether or not they are physically
present, an “Other” is necessary. Furthermore, that Other must know and abide by the discourse
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if the positioning is to succeed: “Any narrative that we collaboratively unfold with other people
thus draws on a knowledge of social structures and the roles that are recognizably allocated to
other people within those structures….We are thus agent…as well as author and player, and the
other participants co-author and co-produce the drama.”130 For analytical purposes, I will rely
largely on later theories of stancetaking, as positioning relies on overly rigid of roles for its
discourse participants. However, positioning is valuable for its elaboration on the moral
consequences of positioning in discourse, both in the circumstances giving rise to discourse and
in what is accomplished by those who are both “allowed” to, and choose to, position themselves
within a particular discourse.
Contemporary Stance Theory
Building on earlier theories of positioning, Du Bois characterizes stance as “a
linguistically articulated form of social action whose meaning is to be construed within the
broader scope of language, interaction, and sociocultural value.” 131 Du Bois admits that the
process of trying to systematically describe the construction and success of stance results in a
“complex web of interconnections linking stance with dialogicality, intersubjectivity, the social
actors who jointly enact stance, and the mediating frameworks of linguistic structure and
sociocultural value…[that are] invoke[d].”132 For the purposes of this project, I am most
interested in the “social actors” who utilize linguistic structures to communicate the
“sociocultural values” that are invoked in the expression of stance. It is important to
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acknowledge, though, that Du Bois notes the presence of dialogicality in stancetaking through
the fact that, like Englebretson’s third principle, a speaker’s stance derives from, is reliant upon,
furthers, and engages the stances that have already been offered, 133 both within the immediate
conversation and the larger, more theoretical, discourse community that the speaker is a part of.
This sense of dialogicality echoes work done by Kristeva discussing Bakhtin, as Kristeva
notes that a text does not merely exist, but rather is generated in relation and response to another
text.134 In Kristeva’s view, a text (or stance act, for my purposes) is never merely an isolated
transmission between speaker and addressee, but rather an ongoing intertextual intersection of
speaker, addressee, text, and the texts/context that have led to that point.135 As it will become
more clear in the next chapter, within the color-blind racial structure of the US, dialogicality
plays a central role in supplying possible options for what a speaker may say in regards to race,
as well as in establishing the boundaries of where they may position themselves within that racial
structure, recalling from the previous section Bourdieu’s discussion of possible futures.
Du Bois’s model of stance— which I rely on in this section and in the subsequent
analysis— is depicted in his model of a “stance act,” in which a “stancetaker (1) evaluates an
object, (2) positions a subject (usually the self), and (3) aligns with other subjects,” resulting in a
triangular relationship between the speaker/subject, the object of evaluation, and another
subject.136 For instance, in response to an immediately prior statement, a speaker may state “I
want to do that too,” in which want provides a positive position towards the stance object, and
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too is the positive alignment with the other subject. Alternatively, “I wouldn’t want to do that
either” suggests a negative position towards the stance object (”would not”), but a positive and
agreeing alignment with the other subject, as seen in the use of either. By offering an
evaluation— or, recalling Harré and van Langenhove, a position— the speaker evaluates the
object, thereby positioning themselves in relation to it, while also aligning themselves with the
other subject, thereby also positioning that subject in relation to the stance object. The alignment
with the other subject may be in agreement or disagreement “by subtle degrees,” and the term
itself suggests the ability for the relationship between the subjects’ own stances to be
“convergent or divergent to some degree,” rather than forced into “a binary choice between a
positive pole (referred to as aligned) versus a negative pole (disaligned).” 137 Furthermore, both
“causal and inferential linkage” is present in the stance act, as both subjects position themselves
while “evaluating a shared stance object,” and both subjects “define alignment with each other”
while positioning themselves. 138 While multiple actions are taking place within the triangle in a
single stance act, Du Bois notes that it is critical for stance analysis that “all three of the three-inone subsidiary acts”— that is, evaluation of the stance object, alignment with the other speaker,
and the other speaker’s evaluative and aligning acts— are acknowledged, even if not all of them
are directly stated in the actual stance utterance. 139 Finally, although the stance act involves the
speaker both aligning themselves with the other subject and positioning themselves in relation to
the stance object, the entire stance act takes place “with respect to any salient dimension of value
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in the sociocultural field,” 140 recalling Englebretson’s principle that stance is indexical by nature
as it relies on wider sociocultural values and beliefs in order to be recognized by others. That is,
by taking a stance the speaker is “necessarily invok[ing] an evaluation at one level or another,”
thus also invoking the larger sociocultural values that frame the stance act as a whole. 141
Stance and Color-Blindness
In defining the kind of work that a stance act can do, Du Bois identifies evaluation as the
most common for undergoing analysis, although he acknowledges assessment and appraisal as
similar tasks accomplished in stancetaking. 142 The type of stance act, though, that is able to be
both “affective and epistemic” in that provides both an evaluative judgement and an
(in)validating statement about the nature of the stance object, is what he calls positioning.143
Positioning as a specific kind of stance act is especially useful in relation to discussions of colorblind language, as it “can be defined…as the act of situating a social actor with respect to
responsibility for stance and for invoking sociocultural value.” 144 Connections can be made,
then, between the stance act of positioning and the use of color-blind language because, as has
been discussed, use of color-blind language is both affective in the implicit values that are
referenced by its users, and epistemic in its necessary invocation of, and reliance upon, the
system of color-blind racism and the racial hierarchy.
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Furthermore, the work of stancetaking advances the aims of color-blind language as seen
in the five central principles that Englebretson identifies. First, stancetaking using color-blind
language does express a personal attitude or belief, but it does so within the confines of the
“social morality” of color-blind racism; and, it could be argued, the level of “physical action”
that Englebretson notes could potentially be seen in the systemic, lived reality of color-blind
racism’s effects. Second, Englebretson’s statement that stance is “public…perceivable,
interpretable, and available for inspection” is complicated by the fact that the values
communicated in color-blind language are, by their nature, non-explicit and encoded. Yet,
despite its seemingly non-racial nature, the “dog whistle”-style function of color-blind language
allows its unspoken intentions to be seen by those who know to look for it. Connecting the
perception of stance to the non-explicit nature of the habitus, I consider the means by which a
person “knows what to look for” as being a matter of “common sense.” As I have discussed,
common sense is in fact not “common” in the sense that it is natural, but rather it consists of
constructed and value-laden implicitly shared knowledge. In the case of color-blind racism and
language, while its boundaries and “rules” are not explicitly available for observation or
questioning, I believe those rules can be brought to light by bringing color-blind racial logic out
of the unseen/un-seeable domain of common sense. Third, building from the previous principle,
color-blind stancetaking relies on a shared use of color-blind language and the meanings
intended in its application, thus fulfilling Englebretson’s condition of stance being “interactional
in nature.” Fourth, as it has been shown, Englebretson’s principle of stance being indexical is
present in the fact that color-blind language does not exist without the “broader sociocultural
framework” of color-blind racism, while at the same time it works to reinforce that framework
through its deployment. Finally, Englebretson’s fifth principle regarding the “real consequences”
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of color-blind stancetaking is seen in the ongoing, lived disparities perpetuated within the larger
system of color-blind racism and the United States’ overarching racial structure. Stance analysis,
then, offers a productive way to examine the deployment of color-blind language in actual
discourse, as it accounts for the implicit nature of color-blind language while providing clear
avenues for analysis, as stancetaking itself is nebulous and varied in nature but able to be
distinguished and isolated for study.
Using Bourdieu’s schema in conjunction with Bonilla-Silva’s color-blind linguistic
strategies, color-blind racism is revealed as an organizing system of social domination that has
been able to survive because of the benefits it confers upon those who are placed into the racial
category of whiteness. At the same time, its covert nature denies the possibility of evaluation or
change, which is supported by the (not at all) “common sense” of racial ideology in the United
States. Such common sense, I have argued, is supported by— and gives validity to— the
racialized attitudes and beliefs implicit in color-blind language strategies. In the next chapter,
then, I turn to the historical context of the Jena Six, as well as the specific analytic methods that I
will employ in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
In this chapter I both introduce the methodology that I will utilize in my analysis in
Chapter 4, and provide an overview of the events leading up to the court trial and sentencing of
the Jena Six in September 2007. What emerge from the case are not only numerous depictions of
color-blind logic at work a la Bourdieu and Bonilla-Silva, but also real and significant
implications for the people involved. To consider the ways that color-blind logic and language
appeared in the discourse surrounding the case of the Jena Six, I examine transcriptions from
four callers in the US who spoke about the events in Jena. I first provide historical context for the
Jena Six trial, then I present my methodology for examining color-blind language, and I
conclude with a more-detailed introduction of the sources used in my analysis
Historical Background
While this project primarily looks at public responses to the Jena Six episode, the
significance of the discourse surrounding the event, and the entirety of what is being referenced
in discussions regarding the Six, should be understood within the circumstances prior to the
actions of the Jena Six. The events surrounding the six students who came to be known as the
Jena Six began in the fall and winter of 2006 in the small town of Jena in central Louisiana.
According to the 2010 US census, Jena had a population of 3,400 residents, with 88.14% of
residents identifying as white, and 11.33% identifying as black or African American. 145
According to numerous news sources, three nooses were found hanging from a tree in the yard of
the Jena High School in September 2006, a day after a black student was seen sitting under a

“Jena, Louisiana Population,” CensusViewer, 2012, http://censusviewer.com
/city/LA/Jena.
145

59
shade tree which was generally known to be where white students assembled together. 146 From
that point, however, news coverage and reporting quickly became tangled and contradictory.
After an opaque investigative process by the school’s administrators and district superintendent,
three white members of the school’s rodeo team were found to have hung the nooses, and the
students’ actions were declared a prank. 147
There was immediate debate in Jena over who the nooses were meant to be seen by, and
whether or not their placement was meant as an act of racial intimidation or if it was meant as a
prank directed towards other members of the rodeo team. It was widely reported that the students
found responsible attended an alternative school for about a month and then completed two
weeks of in-school suspension.148 It was believed by some, however, that the students received
only three days of suspension, and believed the brief suspension to be the result of a decision by
the district superintendent to override the principal’s suggestion to expel the students from the
high school.149 More than ten years later, it is still difficult to untangle many aspects of what
happened in the weeks leading up to December 2006 when the confrontation took place
involving the teens who would come to be known as the Jena Six. An additional point of
frustration within the community that preceded the Jena Six episode was in the fact that,
although many thought the rodeo team members’ actions warranted expulsion or even arrest,
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under Louisiana law the hanging of the nooses could not be considered a hate crime. As LaSalle
Parish District Attorney Reed Walters noted, in the state’s legal codes “[t]he hate crime statute is
used to enhance the sentences of defendants found guilty of specific crimes, like murder or rape,
who chose their victims based on race, religion, sexual orientation or other factors.”150 That is,
the placing of the nooses in the tree by white students could not be investigated as, or considered
to be, a hate crime on its own, regardless of the students’ intentions. Alternatively, the U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana, David Washington, said that FBI agents visited
the scene in September and determined that it “had all the markings of a hate crime,” but were
unable to proceed with prosecuting it as such because the case did not meet federal requirements
for the three white teens to be certified as adults, thus halting the case from proceeding as a hate
crime investigation.151
A series of violent encounters exacerbated racial tensions in the town, including a large
fire that seriously damaged a wing of Jena High School on November 30th— approximately two
months after the nooses were hung from the tree on school property. Rumors were spread of a
gun being pulled the night after the fire on a sixteen year-old black student named Robert
Bailey— later one of the Jena Six— who was beaten when attempting to enter a party attended
largely by white students.152 When faced with the student holding the gun, Bailey managed to
wrest the gun from him, and Baily took the gun home. Bailey was charged with “theft of a
firearm, second-degree robbery and disturbing the peace,” and it is contested whether or not the
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white student who initially pulled the gun on Bailey was charged— some sources say he was
released without charges, 153 while others report that he was charged with simple battery and
given probation. 154 Animosity ran high in the town over the weekend, culminating in an attack
on Justin Barker, a white student at Jena High School.
On Monday, December 4— the Monday after the fire and the episode with Robert
Bailey— Barker, whose only connection to earlier conflict appears to be that he was friends with
the three white students who had hung the nooses from the tree but did not participate with
them,155 was attacked by six black students— Bailey (17),156 Mychal Bell (16), Carwin Jones
(18), Bryant Purvis (17), Jesse Ray Beard (14), and Theo Shaw (17)— and while he sustained
injuries that required medical care, he was able to attend a school function later that day. 157 It
was the charging of the six students— who came to be known as the Jena Six— that turned the
small town into a point of national focus and discussion regarding race relations in the small
southern town and racial disparity within the legal system.
District Attorney Walters initially charged all six students with attempted second degree
murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder— a charge which carried a potential
one hundred total years in prison if convicted of both charges. 158 As jury selection for Bell’s case
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began, however, Walters reduced the charges to “aggravated second-degree battery” and
conspiracy to commit aggravated second-degree battery, which carried a combined maximum
22-year prison sentence.159 When the cases of the six students went to trial in September 2007,
all except Mychal Bell were charged as minors. Louisiana law allowed that because of Bell’s age
at the time of the crime and the inclusion of an attempted murder charge, DA Walters had the
“unreviewable discretion” to charge Bell as an adult. 160 After rejecting a plea agreement that
would have included a suspended sentence, Bell was tried as an adult in front of a jury rather
than pleading guilty to the felony charges. 161 Some sources claimed that Bell’s court-appointed
attorney did not attempt to provide a defense in the courtroom, “instead resting his case
immediately after two days of government presentation,” 162 and all-white jury found Bell guilty
on the battery charge.
However, Bell’s battery charge was overturned when a state appeals court determined
that he should not have been tried as an adult due to Walters dropping the murder charge:
without inclusion of the murder charge, and in combination with the fact that since he was
sixteen at the time of the crime Bell would otherwise have been tried in a juvenile court, Bell’s
case no longer warranted an adult trial. 163 Judge J.P. Mauffray Jr. denied requests that Bell be
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released while the appeal to move his case back to juvenile court was being reviewed, and
because of an unattainable $90,000 bail being set, Bell remained in custody during the
proceedings before ultimately pleading guilty to the battery charge as a juvenile and serving
eighteen months in a juvenile facility. 164 Between the $90,000 bail being set on claims of Bell’s
juvenile criminal record165 and the time it took for his trial and sentencing to be completed, it
appeared to the public that Bell was being effectively imprisoned without cause. Seen as a
miscarriage of justice and a blatant instance of a racial double-standard within the legal system,
Mychal Bell’s imprisonment served as the impetus for the protests and marches in Jena that
would summarize the public awareness of the Jena Six.
Racial Disparity in the Legal System
While it could be thought that the treatment of the Jena Six by the Louisiana legal system
was in some way anomalous, there has been a long-established history of racial disparity among
arrest and sentencing rates and sentencing lengths, despite similar offense rates between racial
groups. In a report submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the ACLU
reported that among defendants with similar criminal histories and charges of the same crime,
prison sentences given to black males within the federal system were nearly 20 percent longer
than those given to white males.166 For juveniles currently serving life without parole (LWOP),
about 77 percent of them are black and Latino, while black juveniles are sentenced to LWOP at
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rates about 10 times higher than white juveniles. 167 Furthermore, the ACLU notes that “[t]he
percentage of black juvenile offenders serving LWOP for the homicide of a white victim (43.4
percent) is nearly twice the rate at which black juveniles are arrested for the suspected homicide
of a white person (23.2 percent).”168 Compared to the arrest rates of black youth for the
homicide of white victims in relation to their sentencing lengths for the homicide of white
victims, “white juvenile offenders with black victims are only about half as likely (3.6 percent)
to be sentenced to LWOP for the homicide crime as their proportion of arrests for suspected
homicide of a black victim (6.4 percent).”169 Thus, white juvenile homicide defendants,
particularly when their victim is black, are sentenced to LWOP at a markedly lower rate than
black homicide offenders of white victims. Criticism of such disparities were central not just to
the protests against the arrest of the Jena Six and Mychal Bell’s trial, but also the criticism
arising from the distinct imbalance in charges pressed against Robert Baily versus the white
student who owned the gun.
Furthermore, racial disparities in criminal charging and sentencing is especially prevalent
within the juvenile justice system. While black youth account for 16 percent of all youth
nationally, they account for “28 percent of all juvenile arrests, 35 percent of the youth waived to
adult criminal court, and 58 percent of youth admitted to state adult prison….Among juveniles
who are arrested, black children are more likely to be referred to a juvenile court and more likely
to be processed rather than diverted.”170 In a wave of criminal legislation reform in the 1990s, the
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majority of states made it easier for juvenile offenders to be tried and sentenced as adults, while
they also increased the sanctions that could be placed on a juvenile defendant.”171 In Louisiana in
particular, and thus with special bearing on the Jena Six, the reforms established two primary
elements of statutory revisions within the juvenile justice system. First, the reforms shifted the
focus of juvenile courts away from rehabilitation and towards “protecting the public,” especially
in the case of violent crime. Second, discretion in giving authority to charge juveniles as adults
was shifted away from the judiciary and towards prosecutors. Louisiana is especially notable in
that its statutes include several ways for a juvenile case to be moved to adult court, and a
prosecutor’s decision to make such a move does not, under state law, require judicial review.172
As Beale observes, Louisiana gives “wide discretion” in cases of “concurrent jurisdiction,” in
which a prosecutor can pursue charges against a juvenile in either juvenile or adult court.173
Under Louisiana law especially, as Duke School of Law professor Sara Sun Beale notes, “the
scope of concurrent jurisdiction is quite broad. It includes all juveniles fifteen years or older who
have been charged with a wide range of crimes,” and while a juvenile’s case can be moved from
the juvenile system to adult court, there is no legal means by which a juvenile defendant can be
moved back to the juvenile system once their case has been transferred to the adult court system,
even if there is good reason to do so.174 Without such a mechanism for returning their case to the
juvenile system, and without a mechanism for challenging the prosecutor’s decision, the
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defendants were entirely reliant upon the prosecutor’s discretion in determining what system
would proceed with their cases. 175
Reception in Jena
Jena’s white residents, who as mentioned above comprised about 88% of the town’s
population in 2010, generally agreed with the court’s decision and were critical of the protesters
who came to march in Jena in a protest led by led by Rev. Al Sharpton on September 20, 2007.
Various national news media organizations reported Jena residents’ reactions and attitudes
towards the protestors. One man, identified only as “Jay,” stated that “They [the protesters] have
the freedom to march and the freedom of speech, but our town is not racist like this is being
depicted…the nooses were just a joke.”176 Or, as one unnamed woman noted, “I don’t agree with
all this, it’s just a mess, it’s ruining our town…we live a simple life and I’m not racist. This is
just blown completely out of proportion.”177 One of the few residents to identify himself, Ricky
Coleman—46, and white— asserted that “I believe in people standing up for what’s right….what
bothers me is this town being labeled racist. I’m not racist.”178 Finally, Alan, a 47 year-old white
man, claimed “There’s no racial thing here more than there is anywhere else.” 179
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It should be noted that, unlike many others, one school board member, Billy Fowler, was
willing to talk to the media. He, along with several other white leaders in Jena, agreed that the
charges brought against the six students were unfair, even as he defended the intentions of the
small town: “I think it’s safe to say some punishment has not been passed out fairly and
evenly….I think probably blacks may have gotten a little tougher discipline through the years.
Our town is not a bunch of bigots. They’re Christian, law-abiding citizens that wouldn’t mistreat
anybody.”180
The defendants and their families, civil rights groups, and public critics of the Jena police
and prosecution immediately saw the severity of charges brought against the six students as a
blatant, racially-fueled double standard. Consider the encounters that preceded the December 4th
attack on Barker: the three white students who hung the nooses at the high school were not
charged with any criminal activity, and the white youth who beat Robert Bailey was charged
only with simple battery while Bailey and three friends who were with him were charged with
aggravated battery and theft after wresting away the gun that had been aimed at them. 181 In
contrast, Walters’s charging of the six defendants with attempted murder was perhaps the most
prominent example of excessive pursuit of criminal charges, especially As Joe Cook, director of
the Louisiana chapter of the UCLA commented at the time: “It appears the black students were
singled out and targeted in this case for some unusually harsh treatment.” 182 Or, as Anthony
Jackson, one of two black teachers at Jena High School noted, “white students can do things and
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receive a slap on the hand…[while authorities] want to throw the book at blacks.” 183
Political posturing through the use of racial appeals did appear to play a significant role
in the sentencing of the six teens. The judge who originally oversaw Bell’s trial was removed
from presiding over those of Baily, Jones, Purvis, Beard, and Shaw, as he stated before their
trials began that the five teens were “troublemakers” and “a violent bunch.”184 In light of earlier
discussions of color-blind language, it is difficult to imagine such language being isolated to a
single judge or the isolated events of the Jena Six. Rather, it can be read as just one instance in a
long tradition of seemingly non-racial language that implicitly implicates the vaguely dangerous
vision of black male criminality; or, in other words, Russell’s previously-mentioned
criminalblackman.
With the proliferation of public disagreement over whether or not the six teens were
charged fairly, not to mention the difficulty of discerning the events that actually happened
leading up to the events of December 4, it is easy to see how the Jena Six became a topic of
national debate and contention. With major news outlets directly contradicting each other over a
number of small but relevant details, it becomes obvious that from the start the general American
public was in no way prepared, or empowered, to be thoroughly informed or knowledgeable
about the prosecution of the Jena Six nor about the socio-racial climate in the small town of Jena.
While there is certainly an investigation to be made over how mainstream media covered the
Jena Six— especially in light of Beale’s observation that “[r]eaders and viewers form welldeveloped expectations based upon stock stories and scripts,”185 such as Bonilla-Silva’s racial
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story lines that are subsequently simplified and perpetuated via mass media— I am interested in
public perceptions of the six teens at the level of individual members of the general public. That
is, I wish to examine the effects of said story lines versus their origins. In light of Shotwell’s
elaborations on “common sense” and the ways in which it is created rather than inherent or
natural, my analysis will focus largely on ways in which public stancetaking regarding the Jena
Six belied socially agreed-upon matters of collective racial knowledge— and, more specifically,
the ways in which it employed color-blind language to maintain and justify current racial
conditions.
Methodology
To examine the four calls that will appear in Chapter 4, I will focus on the presence of the
following five rhetorical and discourse strategies. This list draws from both Bonilla-Silva’s
color-blind frames and strategies discussed in Chapter 3, as well as from the ways in which
color-blind language defines and constrains the assertions of evaluation and belief that are
available to a speaker. As it will be shown, while I will detail the characteristics of each element
further, collectively I will refer to them as the Five Rules of Color-Blind Language.
1. Avoidance of direct racial language
2. Use of Diminutives/Minimization
3. Abstract liberalism
4. Appeals to shared knowledge or “common sense”
5. Evaluative stancetaking and alignment
In Chapter 4 I will analyze discourse samples that observe the ways that each of these five
elements appear and function in natural speech given by four individuals remarking on the events
surrounding the Jena Six trial and protest march. Chapter 5 will discuss at a more hypothetical
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level the ways in which the rules, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, overlap and reinforce each other
to form and maintain a whole and coherent habitus for racial thinking.
Color-Blind Language
1. Avoidance of Direct Racial Language
Since the color-blind racial structure in the US relies on the continued, yet
unacknowledged and unexamined, use of color-blind language to perpetuate its logic, one of the
central, most general rules of color-blind language is the avoidance of direct racial language.
Recalling earlier discussions, at the end of the Jim Crow era and with the ascent and
establishment of the Civil Rights movement, overt racism and racial prejudice became socially
unacceptable and taboo. Bonilla-Silva hypothesizes that while the social acceptability of overt
racism declined in public discourse, so too did people’s available options for discussing anything
explicitly race-related, regardless of attitudes or intentions. The result, he says, was an increase
in heavily-coded and hesitant language when talking about race.186 Indeed, while the Civil Rights
movement did produce beneficial results, the establishment of color-blindness as the social ideal
for racial attitudes in the US, in which race no longer mattered— although, as I have said, this
ignored, rather than solved, real disparities and inequalities that were distributed along the lines
of racial categories— did not necessarily change attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions at the level of
individuals who may have still held to beliefs of racial superiority.
In order to express beliefs that are still negative towards people of non-white minority
races, Bonilla-Silva argues that rather than violate the social prohibition against explicitly racial
talk, people utilize a variety of color-blind language strategies. 187 While all five of the rules will
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constitute the system of color-blind language, I place avoidance of direct racial language at the
forefront both for the ways that it organizes color-blind talk in general, and for its prevalence and
flexibility in everyday speech. Demonstrations of avoidance of direct racial talk which I will
examine in my analyses include: denial of the racial nature of one’s beliefs (“I don’t believe that,
but”) and claims of ignorance regarding the racial nature or impact of one’s statements (“I’m not
sure if…”), both of which work as disclaimer-builders in combination with the other four rules to
effectively express an impenetrable, unquestionably color-blind belief about race. That is, when
indirect racial language is challenged, the speaker need only revert to the defense of “but I never
said anything about race!” to maintain face and social propriety. To identify instances of this rule
in Chapter 4, I will rely on the presence of statements that operate rhetorically in a way similar to
those listed above: denial and claims of ignorance. However, because of the many ways that race
as an explicit topic can be avoided while the speaker implicitly makes a racial argument,
appearances of this rule that fall outside the basic two categories will be examined as they
emerge in the following chapter.
2. Use of Diminutives/Minimization
Following closely from avoidance of direct racial language is another common, highly
versatile strategy for color-blind language: use of diminutive or minimizing language. Similar to
the ways in which indirect racial language such as “I’m not sure if…” or “it might be the case
that…” is used by the speaker to create a sense of hesitation, or a disclaimer to fall back on in the
case of a challenge, diminutive language is that which diminishes the rhetorical “size” of what
the speaker is saying. In cases where a speaker’s views may be too explicit, Bonilla-Silva
observes that they use diminutives or minimizing language to frame the position in a way that is

72
less direct.188
For instance, rather than saying that they are directly opposed to interracial marriage, a
person may claim that they are “a little concerned for their children.” In that instance, the speaker
is using minimizing language to express a position that on the one hand is not explicitly racial in
a way that saying “I am against interracial marriage” would be, but on the other hand is still
maintaining a perspective that in the end reaches the same outcome: opposition to interracial
relationships.
Alternatively, a phrase such as “she shouldn’t take everything so seriously, it was just a
joke” also employs minimizing language. In this instance, the minimizing language is embedded
in the argument of “it was just a joke,” in which the speaker is minimizing the seriousness of “it”
by saying that it was not meant as, or should not be interpreted as, anything more than a joke.
Diminutives, like the forms of “softening” strategies seen in Rule 1, are highly flexible in
their form and are often used in conjunction with other strategies. However, in my analysis I will
identify them as occurring both when narrowing, or minimizing words such as “too,” “just,” and
“a little” are employed, and I will identify the subject of minimization.
3. Abstract Liberalism
Abstract liberalism, as I briefly examined in Chapter 3, is a color-blind language strategy
originally identified by Bonilla-Silva in which the speaker invokes liberal values such as
“liberty” or “justice” at the theoretical level as a way to justify or avoid addressing racializing
practices and beliefs at a more concrete or actionable level. While Bonilla-Silva elaborates upon
it largely as a “frame,” that is, as a broader interpretive filter through which a person can process
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their racial experiences,189 I believe it is both possible and valuable to identify abstract liberalism
as a strategy that is deployed in order to advance and maintain color-blindness. To observe
instances of abstract liberalism in the texts that follow, I will identify them as references to
values that, while generally accepted as positive and beneficial, are presented in a way that is
markedly less-concrete than the point to which they are responding. For instance, “equal justice
under the law” is one instance of the use of abstract liberalism that will be shown in the analysis.
In one speaker’s usage, “equal justice under the law” is used to collectively refer to the Jena Six,
while the victim, Justin Barker is named and clearly identified. In that instance, while “equal
justice under the law” is a widely-held and generally un-challenged value, it is also
comparatively less-concrete than the person of “Justin Barker.” Because of the variety of ways
this rule can appear, and because “abstraction” as it is meant here generally relies on an object of
comparison, I will identify employment of the abstract liberalism frame as taking place when: a.
a value that can be identified and is commonly accepted as beneficial, non-partisan, and desirable
is referenced as something that the speaker supports, commits to, or wants, b. the value is
invoked in in combination with something else as a point of comparison or contrast, and c. the
value is presented as a counterpoint to its contrast in a way that is less concrete, personal, or
action-suggesting, thus discouraging challenges to the speaker on the basis of their perceived
allegiance to said value.
4. Appeals to Shared Knowledge and Common Sense
Building on my discussion in Chapter 4 of Bourdieu’s habitus and the way in which it is
on the one hand a highly structured and structuring organizational schema, and on the other hand
not explicitly identifiable and thus unavailable for observation and critique, I am interested in

189

Ibid., 26.

74
observing the ways in which people communicate knowledge or values that is taken-for-granted
as being shared between speaker and audience. Thus, to observe applications of this rule in my
analyses I will look for statements or rhetorical acts that rely on, or assume, implicit agreement
or understanding, signaling what I have called shared knowledge or “common sense.” As it has
been argued, such “common” knowledge or sense is, in fact, often a matter of constructed and
subjective assumption that provides and justifies expedience for the group that maintains it. What
the speaker assumes their audience already knows, believes, or has in common with them, then,
is often an expression of the speaker’s perception of their relationship to their audience, and an
expression of what the speaker believes does not need to be explicitly stated. Further, I contend
that what remains unsaid or assumed— the part that is being taken as “common sense”— is
unavailable for critique, and in that sense it operates to maintain and further the habitus that it
exists within and is generated by.
As I will discuss in my first sample in the next chapter, references to common sense or
shared knowledge are often built upon “stock stories” that provide a basis for assumed
knowledge, yet at the same time they are not tied down to a particular context and are able to be
utilized in a variety of situations. In comparison to Bonilla-Silva’s racial story lines, stock stories
are not necessarily used in reference to racial matters or in the service of color-blind language.
However, they function in near-identical ways. One such stock story that I have already
discussed is Russell’s criminalblackman, which operates as an unquestionable, all-encompassing
image of black male criminality whose existence is taken to be a matter of “common sense”;
when the presence of the criminalblackman is suggested, then, justification from the speaker is
neither needed nor expected as the veracity of the story— as a product of the color-blind
habitus— has so thoroughly been accepted as true by both speaker and recipient.
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Use of the rule of appealing to shared knowledge or common sense, as I will identify it,
will marked by either a. statements that are reliant upon an identifiable stock story or racial story
line and are given as a statement of fact rather than opinion, and in addition are provided without
justification for the validity of the claim, or b. an explicit signaling of knowledge that the speaker
assumes is shared through the use of the phrase “you know” or “of course.”
5. Stancetaking and Alignment
As introduced in Chapter 2, stancetaking is the means by which people display affect,
evaluation, and/or certainty towards an object, and includes the ways in which people negotiate
their stance in relation to stance-giving others.190 Briefly, stancetaking— in which the statement
of a single stance is defined as a stance act— can be understood using DuBois’s model of a
stance triangle, originally introduced in the previous chapter.

Stance Object

Alignment

Speaker
Other Subjects
“Figure 1. Stance Triangle”
Figure 1, above, depicts the relationships among the three primary parts of a stance act: the
speaker, the stance object, and the other subjects with whom the speaker aligns as part of their
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positioning. As a speaker takes a stance towards an object— especially in evaluative stance—
they are also aligning themselves with other speakers and discourse participants. If stance is the
position a speaker takes towards the subject of their speech, then alignment is the degree to
which the speaker agrees or disagrees with others.
Englebretson provides five central principles of stance, 191 all of which I use to create a
taxonomy of stance act identification. It is important to note that the five principles can work on
their own or in conjunction to signify an instance of stancetaking.
1. Stancetaking occurs on the (often overlapping) levels of physical action, personal
attitude or belief, and social morality. For my purposes, it is primarily the latter two that are
significant, as most instances of stancetaking that will be observed are statements of either
personal values or evaluations of social circumstances.
2. Stancetaking is “public, and is perceivable, interpretable, and available for inspection
by others.” Stancetaking, as it appears in the analyses that follow, is generally performed as the
identifiable conclusion, or at least companion strategy, of the other color-blind rules. I contend
that, as I have defined it, stancetaking is by its nature the result of a combination of other colorblind strategies; as these strategies can be observed and interpreted, the sum total of the stance
act itself can also be observed and interpreted.
3. Stance is interactional in nature. While the text samples in the following analysis are
somewhat unusual in their non-conversational nature (i.e.- they are statements in response to a
single, introductory question from C-SPAN’s news host and therefore do not include responses
to prior statements between two or more speakers), they are statements that are made in response
to Slen’s initial question, and they are statements made in regard to a specific subject. Namely,
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the events surrounding, and issues at debate in, the court case and conviction of the Jena Six. By
nature of the callers’ context—i.e.- Slen hosting “Washington Journal” the morning after the
march on Jena— I believe the statements that the callers take are inherently interactional. While
not conversational, they are prompted by a specific question and their statements are made in
response to Slen’s query and ongoing discussion.
4. Stance is indexical. Relating to the above “stance is interactional,” Englebretson
qualifies stance as being indexical, saying that it “evok[es] aspects of the broader sociocultural
framework or physical contexts in which it occurs.” Similar to the way in which a stance act is in
response to, or in interaction with, another speaker or its audience, the stance that a speaker takes
is also situated within its particular context, and relies upon sociocultural values, attitudes, and
expectations in order to be seen as a legitimate, applicable position that someone can hold in
regards to the topic at hand. Inherent in the ongoing use of color-blind language is the
understanding of what is a “legitimate” position and what is not; as I will argue in Chapter 5,
arbitrary delineations of what is “legitimate” or “acceptable” in discussions about race work to
constrain and maintain the boundaries of current racial systems and our understandings of those
systems, thus limiting future possibilities for racial discourse.
5. Stance is consequential. While it is impossible to know what the consequences were
for the four callers after they provided their statements on-air, the positions they take represent
real and actionable ways of viewing the situation in Jena, and thus they are consequential. While
I only discuss four samples, I suspect that for each of the callers there were many who agreed
with their stated positions. At the same time, there were likely many more attitudes and positions
towards the events in Jena that were not represented in any of the four calls. Nevertheless, the
stance acts that I observe in Chapter 4 are grounded in ways of not only viewing and interpreting
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real events, but also in ways of being and interacting in the world in meaningful ways.
I will use Englebretson’s five principles as the basis for identifying stance in the
following analysis, and will identify both stance and the stance object, as well as degrees of
alignment and the person or group with whom the speaker is aligning (or not) aligning
themselves.
Analysis Source
The discourse samples that I examine in Chapter 4 are drawn from the call-in segment of
C-SPAN’s morning news program “Washington Journal,” which aired on September 21, 2007,
and was hosted by C-SPAN Senior Executive Producer Peter Slen. After speaking to Associated
Press correspondent Mary Foster about her coverage of the march in Jena that had taken place
the day before— which much of the show’s news coverage is in reference to— Slen invites
viewers to call in to the show to offer their thoughts on the court proceedings and subsequent
protest that had taken place in Jena. Telephone numbers for Republican, Democrat, and
Independent lines are provided, although a caller’s choice of which number to use appears to be
entirely self-selecting, and in the case of several callers Slen does not identify which line they
chose.192
The content of the calls ranges from not addressing the topic at hand, such as one viewer
who calls in to thank C-SPAN for their coverage of Jena, to callers who, to varying degrees, have
a distinct opinion on the situation. I am interested primarily in the latter, and my analysis will
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focus on four calls— two from Maryland, one from Virginia, and one from Arizona— that take
stances signaling varying degrees of of approval and support towards the protesters and the Jena
Six students, as well as varying degrees of commitment to those stances. Two are critical of the
protesters, with varying degrees of intensity in their disapproval, while two seem to be generally
in support of, or sympathetic towards, the protesters and the six students— again, however, the
degree to which they commit to those positions are varied. Calls made into C-SPAN from across
the country regarding the Jena Six, and not more-immediate statements made by people in Jena
at the time, were selected for analysis because I intend to focus primarily on the discourse
surrounding situations where the significance of race is being debated. The four C-SPAN callers
provide statements that are fruitful for analysis, then, because their physical distance from the
“action” in Jena results in statements that are generally subjective, opinion-based statements,
rather than a reporting on what was happening in the town at the time. Furthermore, these four
callers were selected because while they provide a range of positive and negative assessments of
the Jena Six, their statements are all approximately the same length and they share a similar
scope in terms of how many topics are discussed, thereby allowing for relatively straightforward
comparisons to be made between them.
Transcription Methods
For clarity and ease of analysis, I will identify and refer to the callers’ genders based on
the traditional understanding that a higher-pitched voice generally correlates to the speaker being
a female, while a generally lower-pitched voice is correlated with male speakers. Furthermore, I
will utilize pseudonyms when referring to the callers: Tammy, Karen, Linda, and Tyler,
respectively.
Textual representation of the calls follows Chafe’s model of intonation units and DuBois’
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transcription conventions. Chafe defines intonation units as “functionally relevant segments” of
speech which correspond with the relationship between the length of a vocalization and the
speaker’s need for inhalation.193 Based on Chafe, I divide the speech samples in the next chapter
into intonation units using the following criteria, which can include any combination of: change
in pitch, change in the duration of syllables or words, change in intensity or volume, changes in
voice quality, and the alternation of speaking and pausing.194 See Appendix for a complete
description of transcription conventions.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS
In the analysis that follows, as introduced in the previous chapter, I examine four
speakers who called in to C-SPAN’s “Washington Journal” news program on the morning of
September 21, 2007 to discuss the marches held in Jena the day prior. In the first two calls, both
participants generally align themselves against issues raised by supporters of the Jena Six, while
the last two calls are generally aligned positively towards, or in support of, those supporting the
six defendants in Jena and marchers who protested the charges. While I will briefly summarize
the major themes of each call in their respective sections, I will discuss the central findings and
themes of all four calls together in Chapter 5. For each caller, the extent to which they seem
committed to their evaluations and positions varies, and they differ the ways they navigate the
constraints established by the unspoken rules of color-blind language. Ultimately, while each
caller utilizes a variety of color-blind rhetorical and linguistic strategies to express their beliefs—
both critical and supportive— regarding the Jena protesters and surrounding issues, they vary in
how successfully they communicate their message. As it will be shown, the unspoken boundaries
established by color-blind language and logic operate as expected by minimizing overt
racialization. By constraining those who attempt to speak explicitly about race regardless of their
intentions, the available options for racial discourse— including future developments and
evolutions— are limited and fixed, and remain without a mechanism for expanding the
boundaries of what can be accomplished within racial discourse.
Negatively-Aligned Speakers
Caller 1
In the first call, a woman from Bethesda, Maryland, “Tammy” generally aligns against
the Jena Six, although the degree to which she commits to her multiple positions on the topic
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vary. Throughout her call, Tammy demonstrates the rules of using diminutives, avoiding direct
racial language, and employing abstract liberalism, while also exhibiting rhetorical incoherence
which Bonilla-Silva considers to be a partial component of color-blind language use. I will first
examine how these rules appear in Tammy’s call and look at how she uses the rhetorical
strategies in conjunction with multiple hedging maneuvers to build a defense against objections
raised about her statement. Then, I will conclude with a discussion of the ways in which her
resulting stance acts, although they appear to be moderate and even self-doubting, are in fact
quite stable and firmly-held. Below is a transcription of Tammy’s call, followed by my analysis:
Slen: Bethesda Maryland Republican, you are on the air. What do you think about the
Jena Six situation?
Tammy:
1 (Good morning).
2 I just want to say that I am
3 `certainly for equal justice under the law
4 but I `can’t understa:nd,
5 why there’s `so /little,
6 uh,
7 spotlight on the
8 `victim of this case.
9 It’s all about you know the
10 `perpetrators
11 and now they’re made,
12 /almost as if they’re /heroes
13 And the it was
14 there was an /innocent
15 `victim
16 and I just don’t understand why the
17 press doesn’t
18 `focus more on that `young `man.
From the outset, Tammy deploys two color-blind language rules in quick succession.
First, her use of “just” in (2) falls under what I have identified as the use of diminutives to
minimize the impact of what she is about to say. While Wilamová broadly defines hedges as
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encompassing a variety of pragmatic markers that modify the strength of an argument, 195
“downgrading” is a subtype of hedging devices that is utilized by the speaker to self-protect by
preemptively lessening the weight or size of the claim they are about to make. 196 “Just”
accomplishes this downgrade by suggesting that what is about to be said is not all that can be
said on the issue, and therefore Tammy is in some way being judicious about what she is
choosing to discuss by focusing in on one particular element. This act of hedging can easily be
considered as coordinating with the color-blind strategy of using diminutives, as both act as an
“out” for Tammy, who to some degree suspects that what she is saying is in some way socially
unacceptable or discouraged. While hedging can be performed in any conversation that could
potentially become face-threatening for the speaker — such as in making a friendly request— its
use in racialized discourse such as this call acts to minimize and guard against being seen as
explicitly discussing, or making “too much” of, race in the situation.
Second, Tammy employs the rule of abstract liberalism by invoking personal
commitment to the value of “equal justice under the law” (3) — a value which she apparently
considers common enough to warrant no further contextualization or justification. Employment
of the abstract liberalism rule, as it has been defined by Bonilla-Silva, consists of using
politically and socially liberal ideals in an abstract manner to explain more-concrete, or de facto,
racial matters.197 Tammy is using abstract liberalism in (2-7) as she compares “equal justice
under the law” in (3) to the much more concrete and identifiable “victim of this case” (i.e.- Justin

Sirma Wilamová, “On the Function of Hedging Devices in Negatively Polite
Discourse,” Brno Studies in English 31, no. 11 (2005): 85.
195

196

Ibid., 89.

197

Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists, 28.

84
Barker) in (8). Since “equal justice under the law” has historically been assumed as a natural or
inherent right for citizens, Tammy’s invocation of it is difficult to challenge or question on
ideological grounds. Yet, even though equal justice under the law is not something that many
would dismiss, in (4-8) Tammy disregards the legal case and individual people behind her
invocation of “equal justice under the law”— i.e.- the Jena Six— in favor of a more
individualized consideration of the real and immediate “person” of Barker. Thus, in this instance
the value of equal justice under the law acts to de-personalize or de-identify the people whom it
concerns in the present moment. By claiming to value equal justice, Tammy is free to not
acknowledge, or is free to identify as a non-issue, the primary point of contention in the Jena
case— i.e.- the charge of racial discrimination and lived experience that result from disparity in
the legal system— while still maintaining that she values equal justice.
At the start of (4), Tammy transitions from abstract liberalism to avoidance of direct
racial language through her use of “but,” which in this instance is acting as an expression of what
Wilamová calls clausal mitigators. Following Wilamová’s definition, clausal mitigators are
utterances that begin with but in order to explain the speaker’s motivation in the presence of a
face-threatening act.198 That is, through the use of “but,” Tammy is providing explanation or
justification for a belief that could otherwise be taken as unacceptable by the audience, and in
that sense deploys a “face-saving” measure. Her use of “but” in (4), then, acts as a way for her to
reach at least partial agreement and therefore maintain “harmonious relations between
participants,”199 as she knowingly moves to take a position that some would consider impolite or
unacceptable for public discourse. Since one of the central points of contention within the Jena
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discourse was the race of the victim compared to the race of the perpetrators, Tammy’s use of
“but” mitigates a statement that could otherwise be read as too directly racial. Without “but” in
(4), Tammy would simply be stating that she values equal justice and is concerned about the
victim in equal part; but, since it appears that she wants to bring the racial identity of the
perpetrators into her evaluation without violating the rules of color-blind language, “but” lets her
rhetorically place her concern for the victim slightly higher than her concern for equal justice
being given to the six defendants. It is important to note, then, that since she does not refer
directly to race, her use of the abstract value of “equal justice” can be read as a euphemism for,
or way to bypass, the role that race could be playing in the situation in Jena. Since direct racial
language is discouraged within the system of color-blindness, Tammy first uses abstract
liberalism and then “but” as an additional safety net as she avoids addressing the fact that the
main point of contention is Jena is, in fact, over the presence of directly racial disparities. In (410), then, Tammy is fulfilling the fifth rule as she aligns against the focus of the protesters and
media coverage, and such an alignment is further solidified in the declaration “I am certainly
for.” As I have argued, however, her alignment is with “equal justice under the law”— an
abstract value— and I contend that the abstractedness of “equal justice” acts as an out for
Tammy.
In (4) Tammy also deploys an additional hedging strategy which can be identified as
tentativizing as she frames her subsequent stance with “I can’t understand.” Following
Wilamová, tentativizers are rhetorical devices that convey hesitation, uncertainty, or vagueness
in an attempt to minimize or soften the explicitness of a statement. 200 On its face, “I can’t
understand” could be taken to mean that Tammy does not, at an informational level, have access
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to the media’s rationale for its focus. From preceding and subsequent utterances though, it seems
that this is not the case since she appears to have little difficulty in taking explicit and
identifiable stances regarding the subject. “I can’t understand,” then, acts as a diminutive, or
“softened” form of “I don’t agree with.” Since such an explicit statement would come close to
breaking the rules of color-blind language by taking a clear stance in a debate where racialized
disagreement is playing a prominent role, “I can’t understand” not only frames the statement as a
sort of personal weakness or lack of comprehension that may elicit a sort of sympathy from CSPAN viewers, but it also softens Tammy’s perceived degree of commitment to the stance she is
about to take. Bonilla-Silva would contend that such language acts as disclaimer or “rhetorical
shield” in the event that Tammy is challenged or confronted for either her racial views or the
ways in which she has expressed them. 201 That is, while Tammy’s degree of alignment may in
fact be quite strong, hedging it with “I can’t understand” disguises the extent to which she is
committed to her position, providing a safety net as she broaches the socially-precarious subject.
In (4-8), with her statement “but I can’t understand / why there’s so little / uh / spotlight
on the / victim of this case,” Tammy is completing the hedging action, as “spotlight on the
victim” is set up (perhaps artificially) as the counterpart to “equal justice under the law,” where
“but” acts as the pivot on which her focus turns. Interestingly, no specification is given on what
she believes a sufficient “spotlight” should entail. This lack of a specific call to action furthers
the possibility that her intention is less about doing something to change or acknowledge the
violence committed against Justin Barker’s, and more about getting attention off of the Jena Six.
(9) supports such a proposition, as Tammy goes so far as to utilize “you know” as she
uses the fourth rule— invoking of a shared common sense or understanding—in a way that
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follows Vincent, Darbaky, and Mettouchi’s argument for the role than you know plays in
discourse. In Tammy’s case in (9-10), the subject of what is “known” is that the media’s focus is
“all about…the perpetrators,” and as I proposed in the previous paragraph, it seems that in
Tammy’s opinion the media’s attention is misplaced and/or unwarranted (an argument which her
subsequent statements will be shown to support). Vincent, Darbaky, and Mettouchi describe
“you know” as a discourse marker that, while able to be used in a variety of ways, is often
utilized to refer to a (presumably) shared knowledge or “common ground”; more specifically, it
is used by the speaker to frame their expression as a “given” for the addressee. 202 Closer to the
purposes of this analysis, Fasching-Varner, in a study on the racial attitudes of pre-professional
white teachers, concludes that “you know” is frequently used by the white subjects to establish a
“shared knowledge about race and Whiteness,” observing that his subjects use the phrase even
when the specifics of “you” in “you know” (i.e.- Fasching-Varner) are almost entirely unknown
to them. 203 When a subject invokes a shared— or “common”— knowledge or sensibility that is
not actually held by Fasching-Varner, Fasching-Varner declares that the appearance of a bond
between researcher and subject is, in fact, a fiction. 204 I contend that Tammy’s use of “you
know” in (9) functions in a similar, although perhaps not as explicitly racial, way. FaschingVarner observes that you know works to create a sort of “racial bond” (although, as just noted,
that bond is not necessarily based in reality), and argues that the result of that bond, however
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temporary, is a sort of “extra room” that lets people state their beliefs without being expected to
articulate the rationale or “the specifics and substance” of their beliefs. 205 Furthermore, FaschingVarner notes that white racial bonding, and subsequent references to that bond through signals
such as you know, is built upon shared “stock stories” or “master narratives,”206 echoing BonillaSilva’s “racial story lines” from Chapter 3.
In this instance, Russell’s archetype of black male criminality— the criminalblackman—
is the stock story that serves as the basis for the image of a generalized “perpetrator,” which in
the next few lines Tammy will use to emphasize the illogicality of equating said perpetrators to
“heroes.” It should be noted that by using the criminalblackman as the basis for the shared
knowledge assumed in her use of “you know,” Tammy is not compelled to justify or further
detail what she assumes is implicitly understood by her audience; if she were to make explicit
her reasons for doing so, the rules of color-blindness would be violated, and indeed, it is possible
that Tammy is not entirely conscious of the basis for her assumed shared knowledge. The racial
bond and subsequent extra room that Tammy creates through her use of “you know,” then,
coincides closely with earlier discussions of habitus and the color-blind system of racial
organization, as both are systems that work to structure knowledge while remaining
unconsciously known to their users and inherently avoid the need for explicit justification— and
subsequently avoid potential critique.
After trying to build a temporary sense of shared or common knowledge by using “you
know,” in (9-10) Tammy makes her first direct reference to the six Jena defendants. She
identifies them as “the perpetrators,” whom she sees as unfairly being made out as
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“almost…heroes,” based on the popular conception of archetypal “perpetrators” and “heroes” as
being clear and longstanding adversaries. While her reference to them as “the perpetrators” is
perhaps a slight use of Bonilla-Silva’s first rhetorical strategy— avoidance of direct racial
language— because of the way that her statement frames them solely in light of the crime they
committed rather than their shared race— again, echoing the archetypal criminalblackman—
more compelling is her perception of them being portrayed “almost as if they’re heroes” in (12).
This alignment of the identity of “perpetrators” with that of “heroes” seems intended to highlight
the absurdity of such an equivalence— an absurdity that is reliant upon an additional shared
understanding or “common sense” about the relationship between conventional heroes and
villains.
No evidence is given of the “heroic” depiction that she says is being made of the six
teens, yet Tammy’s use of “almost as if” in (12) acts as a tentativizer— similar to the one seen in
“I can’t understand” in (4)— which allows her to make her beliefs, which are potentially
contentious, appear hesitant and less-explicit. While she uses minimizing and tentativizing
tactics to soften the explicitness with which she takes her stance, Tammy is nevertheless
fulfilling the fifth rule as she positions herself as being in a stance against the Jena Six and in
alignment against those who support them, as seen in her claim of the media’s depiction of
“perpetrators” as “heroes.” Although she uses “almost as if” in (12) to blunt the force, the social
and ideological weight behind both “heroes” and “perpetrators” suggests the power of her
conviction in her perception of the media’s misguided attention.
Tammy’s “uh” in (6) and “and the it was / there was an innocent / victim” in (13-15)
appears to be a brief instance of what Bonilla-Silva calls “rhetorical incoherence.” Rhetorical
incoherence, as defined by Bonilla-Silva, is an increase in “grammatical mistakes, lengthy
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pauses, or repetition” that occur when a person discusses potentially unacceptable topics,
including but not limited to open discussion of racial issues. 207 As Tammy gets closest to her
critique of the treatment of the six defendants, claiming that they are being treated “as if they’re
heroes” in (11-12), she also relies most heavily on coded language to make her argument.
Bonilla-Silva argues that rhetorical incoherence results when white speakers attempt to talk—
often negatively or critically— about race while at the same time maintain the belief that within
the color-blind social structure, race does not matter.208 The result, he says, is confusion and
often incoherence on the part of the speaker as they set out to talk about race without explicitly
mentioning race as being a factor in their evaluation or belief. In Tammy’s call, then, it follows
that her moment of overt incoherence comes immediately after she makes her most color-blind
reference to the defendants on trial: “It’s all about you know the / perpetrators / and now they’re
made / almost as if they’re heroes.” As discussed above, Tammy’s clearest color-blind criticism
of the Jena Six lies in her contrasting of their “perpetrator” status with their perceived “hero”
depiction by the media, and it seems likely that such a point would be the one at which she,
attempting (albeit unconsciously) to follow the rules of color-blind language, is the most likely to
waver in terms of coherence.
Furthermore, through her statement of “there was an innocent victim” in (14-15), Tammy
is perhaps again using abstract liberalism to justify her reasoning— the liberal value being that of
“innocent victims” as people who deserve sympathy and recognition. In (14-15), and recalling
(4-8), she is further aligning herself against the attention being given to the Jena Six as she
deploys the presence of “an innocent victim” without further elaboration on who he is or what
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should be done for him, again suggesting that her stance on the issue is less about being for
Barker than it is about being against the six teens. Echoing the contrast established by
“perpetrator” and “hero” in (10) and (12), “innocent victim” in (14-15) acts as an additional point
of contrast against which the Jena Six can be labeled “perpetrators,” thus strengthening her
evaluation of the Six and their supporters.
Finally, (16-18) repeats Tammy’s use of tentativizing in “I just don’t understand” to
further minimize the impact her position might make by framing her position as a matter of
personal knowledge and comprehension rather than objective fact. As a result, she maintains an
“out” from accusations of both a. not assessing the situation accurately, and b. overreaching in
what she has the power to say or give her opinion on. Additionally, her use of just acts as a sort
of narrowing-down of her focus, as if to say that the press’s focus is the primary point at which
she disagrees in order avoid charges of being dissatisfied with too many different issues.
While Tammy illustrates how the five rules of color-blind language allow their users to
talk negatively about race in ways that would not be socially acceptable otherwise— especially
through the use of diminutive and minimizing language, and explicit commitment to abstract
liberal values— the next caller shows a challenge to the boundary of those rules. More
specifically, Caller 2, who I call Karen, maintains her alignment against the Jena Six, yet she
speaks much more explicitly about her racial attitudes and uses few hedging strategies. Yet, in
the end, she too is constrained by the limits of effectiveness set by color-blind language.
Caller 2
Karen, like Tammy, is aligned against support of the Jena Six— perhaps even more so
than Tammy. They differ, though, both in the object of their stancetaking, and in their alignment
and justification of their position. Karen, is distinct, too, in how she diverts from following the
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rule of avoiding directly racial language, and while she generally maintains the frame of colorblindness, she does not use many of the minimizing and diffusing tactics observed in Tammy’s
call. In the end, however, it seems that it is Karen’s implementation of the rule of stancetaking,
rather than her violation of color-blind language, that limits her effectiveness in expressing her
evaluation of the situation in Jena.
Slen: Maryland Republican
Karen:
1 /Yes I’m calling.
2 /yes this is horrible what happened down there,
3 but /they should have handled it theirselves
4 Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton have
5 REALLY `got `nerve
6 That /Duke lacrosse?
7 /They
8 BRIBED they `offered
9 that `woman a
10 FULL SCHOLARSHIP
11 so that she would testify against those `three
12 /WHITE.
13 `Duke.
14 `Lacrosse.
15 players.
16 Now that messed their-their lives up.
17 The girl was proven uh that it `never happened.
18 You
19 NEVER heard an
20 APOLOGY from
21 `Jesse `Jackson
22 Al Sharpton
23 They aFrom the outset, Karen invokes a subtle, but identifiable, expectation of common sense or
shared knowledge with “yes this is horrible” in (2). Less explicit in its presumption of a shared
understanding than that seen in “you know,” “yes this is horrible” nevertheless establishes what
the nature of the situation is (that is, it is “horrible”), with no room in the statement for either
further explanation or further questioning. Karen does establish herself as being in alignment
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with people who consider “what happened” to be something that is “horrible,” and while her
opening use of “yes” suggests that she thinks such an alignment should come without question,
she does not clarify what “this” or “what happened” refers to. One could infer that “down there”
is Jena, yet from the start Karen deploys the rule of shared knowledge in her presumption that the
audience recognizes and shares meanings that Karen has not made clear.
In a distinct contrast to (2), then, (3) begins to create a stance that is eventually
established as being clearly positioned against the protesters who marched in Jena the day
before, as Karen argues that “they should have handled it theirselves.” Like Tammy, Karen uses
“but” as a clausal mitigator at the start of (3) to establish a pre-emptive rhetorical defense, using
the beliefs expressed in (2) to justify those that will be expressed in the rest of the call. Who
“they” refers to is not yet made clear, although in her speaking of “what happened down there”
in (2)— considering her own geographical location in Maryland— and her subsequent references
to both Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton, it appears that she is evaluating the actions of the black
citizens in Jena. On the one hand, “they” is not directly identified by Karen; on the other hand,
since support for and against the Jena Six in the town fell generally along racial lines, meaning
that the majority of white residents were not in support of the Six, and since Jackson and
Sharpton are explicitly named by the caller, “they” is best understood as referring to Jena’s black
residents. While later statements will further support my reading of who “they” are in Karen’s
call, Karen does not return to what “it” is, nor does she elaborate on how “it” should be
“handled,” leaving the viewers to question whether she is referring to the nooses left on the tree,
the attack on Justin Barker by the six students, or the public march protesting the charges. Karen
only states that “they” should have worked through the (unspecified) problems “theirselves.”
While it is possible to discern that Karen is talking about the racial conflict in Jena, it should be
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noted that the non-specified “down there” in (2) works in conjunction with the equally unclear
“they” and “theirselves” in (3) to depict the situation in Jena as distant and non-immediate. In
combination with the mitigating language that she uses, the unclear language in (2-3) further
supports a reading of Karen’s attitude in which the entire conflict and subsequent trial was not a
significant enough problem to warrant the involvement of Jackson, Sharpton, or the media
attention that the case brought to the small town.
Sharpton, Jackson, and Duke Lacrosse
Karen leaves her current topic of discussion and makes a sharp turn in her attention in
(4), moving to talk about prior actions by Jackson and Sharpton. Compared to the generalized
“they” in (3), both Jackson and Sharpton were already well-known as black political activists and
commentators by white Americans at the time, and Karen’s statement that the two men “really
got nerve” in (5) shows a clear alignment against them.
While I briefly discussed Sharpton’s ongoing activism efforts in the first chapter, it is
worth noting the central role that both Sharpton and Jackson played in political and social
activism efforts throughout the 1980s and into the early 2000s. Although Jackson was known in
2006 for his 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns, he began his public career working with
Martin Luther King after meeting King at the March on Washington in 1965. In 1966209 King
made Jackson director of Operation Breadbasket, the economic strategy branch of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) that King founded and presided over. 210 Operation
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Breadbasket aimed for black socioeconomic equality through the promotion of black-owned
business, and it was there that Jackson hired Sharpton to work in the New York branch of the
organization.211 Jackson would remain more directly involved in politics through his own
political campaigns and his establishing of two advocacy groups—PUSH in 1971 and the
Rainbow Coalition in 1984—and the merging of the two in 1996.
As early as 1984, however, Al Sharpton was organizing the protest marches that he
would eventually become known for212 as he continued to advocate for racial fairness in legal
cases during the next several decades. Throughout their public careers, however, both men were
subject to considerable controversy and criticism, both from within and outside the black
community. Jackson was widely criticized in 1984 for his public use of an ethnic slur against the
Jewish population of New York City, as well as his continued refusal to disavow the
controversial Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan. His financial management of PUSH and
the Rainbow Coalition was widely questioned too, along with the lack of detailed, viable plans to
implement the policies he campaigned on during his political career. 213 Sharpton, alternatively,
gained notoriety for his activism in the 1987 Tawana Brawley case, in which a young black
teenage girl’s rape claim was ruled to be a hoax. Sharpton publicly accused a white assistant
district attorney of being one of Brawley’s attackers in that case despite a lack of evidence, and
the accused man, Stephen Pagones, won a $65,000 defamation suit against Sharpton. Sharpton’s
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financial abilities as well as his numerous failed political campaigns were also questioned, and
he was often criticized for public statements that were at times racially inflammatory and read as
encouraging violence against non-black people. 214
By the time of the Duke Lacrosse rape and Jena Six cases in late 2006, then, both
Sharpton and Jackson were widely-known for their highly-public political and organizational
activism efforts, but both had also been significantly featured in the media for the criticisms
noted above. As a result, they were both recognized for their work in bringing opportunities to
black urban communities, but were both equally noted for their controversial public statements
and beliefs about how racial equality should be brought about. Nevertheless, they held
significant media attention and were able to organize sizeable marches and protests, as
demonstrated in their collaboration in organizing the march in Jena.
By not acknowledging the role that Sharpton Jackson played in organizing the march in
Jena— which likely contributed to the size and media coverage of the event— and instead only
claiming that the two men have “really got nerve,” Karen works to simplify their involvement in
a racially-charged and legally-complex situation down to a matter of personal brashness. Such a
characterization of Jackson and Sharpton’s involvement in Jena is supported later in the call by
her elaboration on their role in the Duke Lacrosse scandal which I discuss below. Her statement,
then, becomes somewhat surprising in its explicit racialization as she noticeably does not use
indirect or coded language to make her argument, and instead explicitly names Jackson and
Sharpton who, in many instances, had been seen as speaking on behalf of the larger black
community. It is telling that throughout her statement, aside from the brief appearance of what

Michael Slackman, “Sharpton Runs for Presidency, and Influence,” The New York
Times, December 5, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/05/us/sharpton-runs-for-presidencyand-influence.html
214

97
could be an assertion that relies common sense in (2-3) regarding the “horrible” nature of the
situation, and the belief that the black residents of Jena should not have brought in outside media
or protesters, Karen makes no observable hedging maneuvers, nor does she utilize any of the
color-blind language rules short of being overtly racist in a way that would be socially
unacceptable. Instead, she talks explicitly about race through her naming of Jackson and
Sharpton
From the first mention of Jackson and Sharpton in (4) through the end of the call in (23),
Karen turns to critique Jackson and Sharpton’s involvement in the Duke lacrosse team scandal
that occurred in March 2006, before she is apparently cut off from the broadcast by Slen in (23).
The Duke lacrosse scandal, which happened in March 2006, began when Crystal Gail Mangum,
a 27 year-old black woman hired to work as a stripper at a party hosted by Duke University’s
lacrosse team, accused three of the players of rape. 215 The subsequent court case was highly
publicized, Mangum was found to have falsified her claims, and all charges against the three
players were dropped in April 2007. 216 While a full elaboration of the racial elements at play in
that court case and the subsequent dismissal of charges against the team are outside the scope of
this project, the proceedings were nevertheless highly publicized, and highly racialized, due in
part to perception of Jackson’s and Sharpton’s involvement. Karen’s criticism lies primarily in
what she sees as Jackson and Sharpton’s role in “messing up” the lives of the members of the
Duke lacrosse team, as she argues that they bribed the black woman who claimed she was the
victim in the case, Mangum, to provide false testimony against the members of the all-white

“Duke Lacrosse Players Arrested on Rape Charges,” NPR, April 18, 2006,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5348321.
215

Julia Lewis and Cullen Browder, “Duke Lacrosse Charges Dropped,” WRAL.com,
April 11, 2007, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1245389/.
216

98
lacrosse team. It should be noted that on the one hand Sharpton did appear on Fox News’s “The
O’Reilly Factor” to discuss the case a month after the initial events, where he viewed the
prosecutor’s decision to proceed with the case as a sign that, despite questions about the veracity
of Mangum’s claims, there was enough evidence in her favor for a trial to proceed. 217 On the
other hand, Karen’s claim in (7-15) that both Jackson and Sharpton “bribed” Mangum with a
“full scholarship” to “testify against those three white Duke lacrosse players” appears to be in
reference to an announcement made by Jackson in early April 2006 that his Rainbow/PUSH
Coalition would pay Mangum’s college tuition. Jackson noted that he would pay even if
Mangum was found to be lying, saying that she would never again “have to stoop that low to
survive.”218 (4-5) clearly demonstrates that Karen is critical of Jackson and Sharpton’s actions in
that situation, and presumably at the time of her call to C-SPAN she was critical of their presence
in Jena. While the Duke case was ultimately dismissed after the discovery of Mangum’s making
false claims against the team, the Jena Six situation was similarly racially charged although
under different circumstances, and because the two cases were in the public’s attention around
the same time it became unlikely that people following both cases— like Karen— would fail to
draw parallels between the two. For perspective, while Mangum’s initial rape claims were filed
in March 2006 and the Jena Six’s attack on Barker took place in December 2006, the charges
against the Duke lacrosse team were dropped in April 2007, and the march and trial in Jena
began just five months later in September 2007. One can see a variation on the first rule of color-
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blind language (avoidance of direct racial language) at work in Karen’s logic here: Because of
the close window of time between the court trials of both cases, and because of the presence of
Jackson and Sharpton in both cases, one could reach the conclusion that, because Mangum lied
while being associated with Jackson and Sharpton, the claims of injustice made by the Jena Six
were equally invalid and nothing more than “race baiting” 219— a term widely applied by white
critics of Jackson and Sharpton’s actions in the Duke case. By drawing an equivalency between
the Duke Lacrosse case and the Jena Six rather than directly stating her opposition to the Jena
Six based solely on its own elements, Karen projects the most contentious aspects of the Duke
Lacrosse case on to what is at stake in Jena, and in that way is able to avoid saying where her
objection truly lies.
Where Tammy made careful and frequent use of multiple color-blind linguistic strategies
to communicate a position that was generally negatively-aligned while still being “polite” or
socially acceptable, Karen makes far fewer moves to hedge her positions, and she is explicit in
her naming of who is at fault. This call stands out as distinct, then, in its explicit and strong
alignment against supporters of the Jena Six, its lack of minimizing or “softening” language, and
its shift in focus that, while ultimately cut short by Slen, can be seen as maintaining a logic about
the way that race, and racial identity, is deployed by individuals. Furthermore, in her emphasis
on “white / Duke / lacrosse / players” in (12-15), Karen is explicitly highlighting the racial
identity of the lacrosse players whom she considers to be the “real” victims in the case. By
emphasizing the racial identities of the defendants in the Duke lacrosse case, Karen implicitly
argues that a. the racial identities of Sharpton and Jackson were significant to their involvement
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with Mangum, and b. those racial identities are also at play in their involvement in Jena. One
could suspect that Karen’s move towards increasingly explicit racial language is what leads to
Slen’s decision to remove her from the on-air broadcast at the end of (23). It is important to note,
however, that Karen falls short of explicitly identifying “what happened” in (2) and “it” in (3),
although one can surmise that through her mentioning of Jackson and Sharpton she is referring to
the legal trial and seeming inequality present in the charges against the Jena Six. Karen attempts
to draw a connection between the Duke case and Jena through her mentioning of Jackson and
Sharpton, presumably suggesting that like the racially-charged claims that ultimately turned out
to be false in the Duke case, Jackson and Sharpton are trying to win a false victory at the expense
of a white “victim” in Jena. In that sense, Karen is recalling the image of the criminalblackman
by framing the actions of Jackson and Sharpton as seemingly devious, and by extension is
including the Jena Six as criminalblackmen who are trying to “get away with” committing the
assault on Barker. Yet, Karen does not make her statement explicit enough to be understood and
agreed or disagreed upon by the audience. For all of the ways that her call is notably explicit in
its centering on a racially-charged situation— that is, the Duke lacrosse case— Karen’s lack of
naming the elements or actors unique to the Jena case suggests that even without abiding by the
color-blind rules that are meant to blunt the force of expressing racial beliefs, speakers perhaps
unintentionally follow the first rule of color-blind language: Avoidance of talking directly about
race. That is, Karen uses vague language to stake her position in an otherwise racially-direct
statement, resulting in the inability of listeners to identify— and consequently align with or
against— the stance she is taking over how much, or what kind of, attention should be paid to the
events in Jena.
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Conclusions
Although similar in their shared general alignment against the claims made by the
protesters and supporters of the Jena Six, Tammy and Karen are distinct both in their aims and
their strategies. While Tammy speaks out most directly against the media’s depiction of the six
teens in Jena, Karen seeks to communicate her critique of Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton’s
presence in Jena, especially in light of their involvement in the Duke lacrosse case several
months prior. Tammy’s position is much more coded and couched in minimizing and
tentativizing language so as to not come too close to openly talking about the racial elements at
play in Jena, although she ultimately holds a position that is clearly not aligned with the Jena
defendants. Alternatively, Karen is much more assertive in her stance against the Jena defendants
and protesters, and while her statement is not overtly racist she does not employ race-avoiding
language, and in that sense her statement is remarkably racial. In the end, however, Karen takes a
strong stance against the presence of Jackson and Sharpton in Jena yet fails to give reasons for
her objection to them outside of their involvement in the Duke lacrosse case. Regardless of her
intentions, Karen discusses Jackson and Sharpton only in the context of a case where the race of
Jackson and Sharpton was seen as a sort of impairment to their judgement which therefore
resulted in false charges being brought against the Duke lacrosse team. By making Jackson and
Sharpton’s race the hinge upon which the connection between Duke and Jena turns, Karen
violates the rules of color-blindness and Slen responds correspondingly by cutting off her call in
the television broadcast.
Positively-Aligned Speakers
In the final two calls, both participants are generally aligned alongside or with the issues
raised by those protesting on behalf of the Jena Six. While their stance acts are largely positive,
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in the sense that they are generally in support of the discourse Slen is discussing in the segment,
these callers, too, are constrained by the limits of color-blind language. While the specificity and
forcefulness with which they can communicate their position is hindered by the overarching, yet
unspoken, rules of talking about race, they attempt to challenge the ways that race is— or is
not— a part of the public discourse in Jena.
Caller 3
Unlike the first two calls, this caller from Queen’s Creek, Arizona, from a woman who I
will call Linda, generally aligns herself with the protesters and seems to be sympathetic to the
Jena Six defendants. Nevertheless, like the previous callers she utilizes minimizing and hedging
devices to frame the evaluations and stancetaking that she performs, yet the presence of colorblind strategies differs in crucial ways. Notably, she utilizes hedging devices to conclude with a
stance that is clearly against the critics of the Jena Six, and more specifically, against the
townspeople of Jena. I divide the call into three primary segments: Linda’s evaluation of the
townspeople of Jena, her evaluation of the noose-hanging performed by the Jena high school
students, and her linking of the students’ actions and the response from Jena.
Slen: uh Queen’s Creek Arizona you’re on the air
Linda:
1 /Yes um my…
2 um `question is is that
3 I /hear a lot of,
4 `townspeople say
5 you know um
6 `“we don’t ag/ree with this”
7 But they don’t say exa:ctly
8 `how they feel
9 other than…
10 “no, we don’t agree with this.”
11 You know
12 but but the `actions
13 of the students,

103
14 there /is
15 you know a
16 `sign to it
17 there.
18 We `feel,
19 as,
20 African Am/ericans
21 that,
22 you know there’s a /symbol to it
23 it’s not just,
24 a `pra:nk
25 and that, I think that’s what we feel from,
26 the people
27 IN Jena
28 is that it’s
29 ju:st a `prank
From the outset with (1-2), Linda makes a minor speech repair through her brief
rhetorical incoherence and recovery seen in “yes um my / um question,” before establishing her
forthcoming statement as if it will be a question when she states “my question is is that”;
although, by (3) and through the rest of her call, she does not posit any sort of question to Slen or
the viewers. While the use of proposed questions is not in the literature as a hedging device, it
seems likely that her use of a question-centered framing for her statement is operating similarly
to the tentativizers seen with Tammy. That is, “my question is” establishes a sense of hesitation,
and perhaps personal uncertainty or vulnerability as a way to elicit sympathy and build
connection with the audience, in a way that is similar to statements such as “I’m not sure why”
or “I can’t understand why.”
In (3-4)— “I hear a lot of / townspeople say”— Linda refers to what she assumes is the
reasoning that is common among the people of Jena, although it is only suggested that she is
referring to Jena’s residents based on later statements since no explicit clarification is given. By
relaying the words used by the townspeople, “we don’t agree with this,” Linda explicitly
positions the statement that will appear in (6) as language that she does not necessarily ascribe to
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herself— language which she further details in (7-10). Moving from (1-4) to (5-6), Linda uses
“you know um” to follow the fourth rule of color-blind language before relaying the sentiment of
“we don’t agree with this” that she believes is common among the people of Jena. In (5), Linda’s
use of the discourse marker “you know” operates in a way similar to Tammy’s use of it, in that
“you know” functions to create a temporary bond of shared or common knowledge between
herself and her audience. The difference for Linda, however, is that rather than the assumed
mutual understanding being about the nature of the protesters in Jena, the assumed mutual
understanding is about the generally negative reactions by the residents of Jena towards those
protesting in support of the six teens. What the audience should presumably already “know” in
order to recognize and understand Linda’s use of “you know” in (5), then, is perhaps not as
obvious as it is with other callers or in other instances, since the stock stories upon which
invocations of “you know” usually rely is not immediately clear in Linda’s use of the phrase.
Recalling Bonilla-Silva’s examination of racial story-lines, Fasching-Varner, as
mentioned in the discussion of Tammy’s call, argues that successful use of you know relies upon
a generalized narrative that is shared between speaker and audience. For Bonilla-Silva, the storylines surrounding discussions of race, by their definition, function to provide explanations for
why things are the way they are in order to maintain the current racial hierarchy. Such story-lines
must therefore be widespread, well-known, and unchallenged.220 To return briefly to Tammy’s
call, she utilizes an assumed shared knowledge in order to build an unspoken connection
between herself and her audience. Within her call, one can see how her use of “you know” when
describing what she sees as undeserved acclamation for the Jena Six both employs and
perpetuates negative perceptions of young black men. To use you know in reference to what the

220

Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists, 76-77.

105
white residents of Jena think and feel, however, does not come with a readily available stock of
culturally-perpetuated narratives or attitudes. Thus, in the instance of (5) in Linda’s call, the
audience must work harder to determine that Linda’s use of “you know” is based in the
assumption that anyone, regardless of race, would want equality and an end to racial hostility and
inequality.
While the “this” in “we don’t agree with this” in (6) is not specified here or even later in
the call— although (17-22) will suggest that Linda is referring to the nooses hung on the tree at
Jena high school— here she uses constructed dialogue to transmit the line of argument that she
says is common among the people of Jena. She uses “I hear a lot of / townspeople say / you
know um / ‘we don’t agree with this’” in (3-6) in conjunction with the “but” at the beginning of
(7) to act as a clausal mitigator for what she says in (7-8): “they don’t say exactly / how they
feel.” By acknowledging what she believes is a commonly-held attitude, (3-6) acts as a sort of
minimizing preparatory statement, and as a result Linda creates more rhetorical space for herself
to be explicitly critical of the townspeople in (7-8). One could hypothesize that, had she used
even more additional minimization and hedging, she would have been able to perform an even
harsher critique of the townspeople in (7-10), as she would have created a wider margin for
herself to be critical while remaining within the bounds of socially-accepted discourse.
In the remainder of (7-10), Linda is again expressing what she believes to be the feelings
or attitudes of the townspeople, as exemplified in the statement “no we don’t agree with this”
where “we” is the residents of Jena. Linda, however, is framing the attitudes of the townspeople
in such a way as to make it appear that their attitudes are insufficient or ineffective for the
situation in Jena, as seen in her use of “other than” in (9), as if to say that the townspeople’s
attitudes extend no further than “no we don’t agree with this.” Additionally, “you know” at the
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end of (10) further acts to present the townspeople’s attitudes towards the Jena Six as a “given,”
or at least as something that should not be questioned too much. Altogether, in (3-10) Linda is
establishing her stance on the subject, but in contrast to earlier callers, the object of her stance is
not the six defendants or their charges, nor does it have to do with the protest march. Rather, in
this instance the object of Linda’s stance is the townspeople’s response. Through her use of “but
they don’t say exactly / how they feel” in (7-8), it seems that rather than sharing a stance object
with the residents of Jena, Linda’s stance object is the townspeople of Jena and their response—
or lack thereof— towards the Jena Six and their treatment within the legal system.
In (12-24), Linda changes focus to discuss the actions that took place at Jena High School
two months prior to the incident with Barker. With “the actions / of the students” in (12-13) and
“there is / you know a / sign to it” in (14-16), as well as the reference made to her own African
American identity in (18-20), it becomes apparent that the “this” in (6) and (10) is the event in
which the white students hung nooses from the tree on school property in September 2006,
which also clarifies the “it” in (16). This clarification comes about both through Linda’s
invocation of the “actions of the students” in (12-13) and, as I discuss, her describing their
actions as “not just a prank” in (23-24)— both of which were descriptors used in the media to
describe the event of the nooses— as well as through her expression of how “we feel as African
Americans,” recalling that the black residents of Jena were the group largely and publicly
responsible for pushback against the leniency given to the students responsible for hanging the
nooses. Interestingly, while Linda appears to self-identify as African American in (18-20)— with
“we feel / as / African Americans”— her use of “you know” in (15) and (22) draws attention to
the “common sense” of why the black community would take special offense at the actions of the
white students. Such a “common sense” would be reliant upon a shared knowledge and
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understanding of American racial history, and in particular the role that lynching played in the
oppression of black Americans. In (18-24), then, it seems as if she is trying to make a
sympathetic connection with the wider audience, regardless of their race, as if to say that for
people like the herself, the actions of the students were much more meaning-laden than they
were for white Americans.
Such a reading of “you know” in (15) and (22) is further supported by Linda’s statement
in (23-24) that “it’s [the nooses] not just / a prank,” which again suggests that for people like her,
the act of the nooses being hung at the school could not be seen merely as the immature or illadvised choices of a few young students. In this statement, she is taking a stance that is openly
critical of the townspeople’s enactment of one of the rules of color-blind language: use of
diminutives. That is, Linda recognizes the ways in which defining the events with the nooses as
“a prank” downplays their significance, and she is drawing attention to the minimization that has
been performed by others rather than participating in a sort of minimization herself. In (23-24),
then, the object of her disapproval is not necessarily the noose-hanging, but rather the
townspeople's minimization of the seriousness of the act. Two elements come together to make
up the object of Linda’s criticism: first, the townspeople’s consideration of the students’ actions
as “a prank,” and second, the townspeople’s avoidance of what could be considered direct racial
language through their saying of “we don’t agree with this” in (6) and (10), especially since
“this” is never made clear, and “don’t agree” is hardly an explicit disapproval of an act that many
blacks took as a sign of overt racial threat with historical precedent. In combination, these two
elements illustrated the ways that the response from the white community in Jena was, for Linda,
insufficient and short-sighted.
In the final segment of her statement, Linda moves to summarize the connection between
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the actions of the students in Jena and the townspeoples’ response. With “I think that’s what we
feel” in (25), Linda, like Tammy and Karen before her, uses minimizing language to tentativize
her statement and hedge the perceived severity of the judgment she is making. By hedging her
statement with “I think,” she is in a way exempting herself from accusations of speaking too
broadly or trying to have the “final say” on what the townspeople of Jena think. Additionally, her
use of “that’s what we feel” in (25) operates in a similar way, attaching the perceptions of the
African American population— presumably, based on her use of “we” in (18)— to a “feeling,”
creating room for the possibility that the African American community’s perception of the event
was somehow mistaken or flawed. Yet, looking at the call in its entirety, it is clear to the
audience that rather than operating from a presumption of self-error, Linda is in fact taking a
clear stance against the townspeople and their initial response to the actions of the students.
Although still constrained by color-blind language in how explicit she can be, I believe Linda
makes effective use of the rule of appealing to shared knowledge and common sense as an
empathy-building strategy as seen in her multiple uses of “you know.” These appeals, in
combination with an appeal to the historical symbolism of the noose-hanging that took place in
Jenahyu, work to illuminate Linda’s position as an individual and as a speaker; and, for her
audience, they illustrate the stakes of a discourse that results from, and results in, lived and
substantive experience.
Caller 4
The final call is from Tyler, a man in Alexandria, Virginia. This call stands in marked
contrast to Linda’s in that while also appearing to be generally aligned with, or supportive of, the
cause of the Jena protesters, Tyler is most notable for the hedging and color-blind maneuvers that
he does not use.
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Slen: Alexandria Virginia independent line you're on the air what do you think about the
Jena Six situation
Tyler:
1 /Um I actually feel that this /case is,
2 this is a,
3 is a `branch off of historic events that occurred in the past that’s
4 `undiscussed.
5 It `hasn’t been discussed in years,
6 and `this is what
7 `happens
8 when `generations…
9 when the `generations…
10 have `not discussed this issue.
11 And it’s `people, that are,
12 my age,
13 which is like, in the `twenties
14 that `have to discuss it `now
15 which /is,
16 which is a good and `positive thing
17 but,
18 now it’s the-it’s the fact that
19 people `fighting over
20 /who is the `victim
21 (in the situation)
22 it it it’s the battle of
23 who is the `victim
24 you have `whites saying /they’re the victims
25 you have `blacks saying /they’re the victims
26 both sides have
27 /reasons to be victims,
28 however no on sits down to actually
29 `debate this
30 because it’s
31 `not
32 `important to many people.
33 Although people are discussing it /now,
34 /will it be important in a couple of weeks,
35 `that’s the question.
Tyler begins (1) with an instance of repair through the use of “um,” and like the three
callers before him he tentativizes with “I actually feel.” By prefacing his call with the statement
that what follows is a matter of “feelings,” Tyler distances himself from accusations of being
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wrong or too direct, regardless of what he actually says, thus employing the third rule of colorblind language: minimization.
While “this case” in (1) is presumably in reference to the trial and sentencing of the Jena
Six, Tyler utilizes the fourth rule to reference a shared knowledge in (2-3) with “this is a is a
branch off of historic events that occurred in the past,” as he refers to what is presumably the
history of racial inequality in the United States; yet, in his statement he does not explicitly say
what the historic events are, and instead assumes that his audience will understand his reference.
Later statements from Tyler will stand in contrast to the other callers in the way that he is more
explicit about the role that race has played in the Jena situation. Yet, from the outset, Tyler
invokes common sense in that he does not clarify or expound upon the “historic events” that he
uses to introduce the rest of his statement. Although Tyler’s position is clear in that the audience
knows what he sees as the relationship between “this case” in (1) and “historic events” in (3)—
that is, the Jena case as “a branch off of” the historic events— his direction of alignment is seen
through the attention he believes should be paid to the issue, rather than through a direct praise or
critique. In (3-5), Tyler’s use of “undiscussed” and “hasn’t been discussed in years” to describe
the historic events that have led to the case suggests that he believes there is a gap or lack in how
history has been remembered and transmitted, leading the audience to assume that to some
degree he does not approve of how the current situation is being understood, explained, or
handled. Tyler seems to be aware of potential challenges to his position, though, as it has been
discussed how his use of “I actually feel” in (1) tentativizes the forthcoming statement; such
hedging acts as a self-acknowledgment of the fact that his stance may not be widely or
automatically accepted, regardless of how it is actually received by the audience.
It is again unclear what “this” is in both “this is what happens” and “this issue” when
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Tyler states that “this is what / happens / when generations / when the generations / have not
discussed this issue” in (6-10)— is he referring to the nooses hung on the tree at the high school?
The attack on Justin Barker? The prosecution of the Six? The protest march that took place the
day before? As he has not yet taken a stance either for or against the Jena Six and those who are
protesting on their behalf, it seems that he is generally supportive of them, yet the lack of direct
and explicit language in (1-10) makes his intended meaning difficult to determine. On the one
hand, it is possible that his avoidance of direct racial language is being used, like Tammy and
Karen before him, in a way that follows the first rule of color-blind language in order to express
a racial attitude or belief that would be socially unacceptable or discouraged if the language were
more explicit. On the other hand, it is possible that while he may be attempting to make a
statement that is in support of the Jena protesters, Tyler is trapped, as it were, within the bounds
of color-blind racial language. That is, while Tyler is attempting to say something in support of
those in Jena, the boundaries set by color-blind language restrict him from explicitly
acknowledging the racial nature of the protest in order to prevent violation of the overarching
rule: avoidance of direct racial language. The invocation of a wrongly-understood or
unacknowledged historical past in (3-10) suggests that Tyler is attempting to bring a forgotten
racial narrative to light, or trying to challenge or re-frame commonly accepted understandings of
racial history. In this instance, the language that would normally be used by people to express
their racial— and potentially racist— beliefs in an indirect and socially-acceptable way is in fact
constraining language that is attempting to draw attention to the historical realities and functions
of race. In that sense, Tyler’s inability to specify the exact nature of the historical problem
demonstrates the limiting function of color-blind language, as he cannot challenge what he
cannot name and address. As it will be demonstrated, though, as Tyler shifts his focus from the
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conflict’s historical origins to its current stakes he is ultimately able to explicitly foreground the
role of race in the ongoing hostility in Jena, and in that way disrupt the boundaries established by
color-blind language and logic within this particular discourse.
In (11-13) Tyler moves to self-identify to some degree by disclosing his age, as he argues
that “it’s people that are / [his] age / which is like in the twenties / that have to discuss it now.”
While the “it” in (14) is presumably the same “it” as in (5) and is still not specified, Tyler asserts
that that people of his age have a responsibility or duty to directly address the issue, as seen in
his use of “have to” in (14). (15-16) establishes the positive stance that Tyler takes towards the
potential for open discussion, as he describes the needed discussion in (16) as a “good and
positive thing”
In (17) through the end of his call, Tyler demonstrates several rhetorical moves, yet he
does so in a way that is essentially different not just from Tammy and Karen, but also from
Linda, with whom he perhaps shares the most alignment. While (18) and (22) begin with some
repair that could signal brief swerves into rhetorical incoherence, Tyler establishes and maintains
the position that occupies the rest of his call. His use of “now” in (18) suggests that, unlike the
“historic events” in (3), the fundamental problem at the heart of the Jena conflict has changed.
(17-22) reveal that in Tyler’s perception, the conflict is a “battle” over what racial group can
rightfully claim the title of “who the victim in “the situation.”
While “the situation” that Tyler is discussing could reasonably be the victimization of
Barker as a survivor of violent assault versus the victimization of the Jena Six as participants in
an unfair legal system and the questions of who deserves the media’s— and the public’s—
sympathy, he does not clearly delineate what “the situation” is in (21). By extension, the nature
of the victimization that is being fought over is also unknown. By presenting the conflict
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between the black and white groups as “fact,” as seen in (18), Tyler presents his interpretation of
the conflict as one that, while not widely-shared, is better-representative of what is politically,
socially, and historically at stake. Furthermore, recalling (3) in which he says that the case and its
surrounding events are “a branch off of historic events that occurred in the past,” Tyler is not just
commenting on the current contentions in Jena, but also recalling “historic events” to do so. In
that sense, while Tyler’s deployed language is much more vague, he joins Linda as the only other
caller who attempts to contextualize the response from either racial community in Jena in light of
history.
In a moment that is remarkable in its distinction from the previous three callers, in (2425) Tyler directly states what he believes to be the racial nature of the conflict in Jena: “you have
whites saying they’re the victims / You have blacks saying they’re the victims.” While he does
not define the nature of their victimization— even though within Jena white residents said
Barker deserved the most attention while the black residents said the focus should be on ensuring
a fair trial for the Jena Six— in (24-25) Tyler is on the one hand not hedging his assertion about
the nature of the conflict in any way, and on the other he is violating the color-blind rule of nondirect race talk. Indeed, through his naming of black and white racial identity, in this instance
Tyler is violating the boundaries of being color-blind. It is noteworthy, though, that while he is
clear is his assertions of the nature of the conflict, Tyler does not definitively position himself in
alignment with either side. While a lack of obvious personal alignment could be read as an
attempt to create a sort of color-blind appeasement for an audience that may be inclined to
disagree with him, his color-blind rule-breaking in (24-25) still stands as he acknowledges the
history of challenges and inequalities that both racial groups can lay claim to, as he observes in
(26-27) that “both sides have / reasons to be victims.” At the same time, however, color-blind
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logic may still be at play in Tyler’s call, as he mentions the possible victimization of both black
and white groups. On the one hand, Tyler may, as I said above, believe that there is a history of
both groups being oppressed or mistreated in some way. On the other hand, if Tyler does in fact
believe that one group has historically been more victimized than the other, the constraints
against direct racial language prevent Tyler from saying so, and he must equalize his alignment,
as it were, by including both black and white histories in his assertion.
In (28-32), Tyler fulfills the fifth rule of color-blind language as presents his evaluative
stance, most clearly demonstrated in his statement that “however no one sits down to actually /
debate this / because it’s / not / important to many people.” While he does not explicitly align
himself with or against any of the involved parties in Jena, in a move similar to Linda his
criticism is directed most clearly towards people who are uninformed or perhaps critical of the
events in Jena, rather than the protesters themselves. In Tyler’s case, he sees the primary issue
lying in the fact that “it’s not important to many people,” demonstrating that his criticism is
towards people who simply do not care, or in his estimation do not care enough. It should be
noted, though, that by observing the low priority that “this” and “it” hold when he says that “no
one sits down to actually debate this because it’s not important to many people,” Tyler is in a
way acknowledging that the position he holds is admittedly uncommon. That is to say, in order
to evaluate the presence or lack of concern on the issue, Tyler has to know that the issue exists
and must hold a certain level of concern against which he can compare others. In this instance,
then, while not apologizing or backing down from his violation of the rules of color-blindness,
Tyler is showing an awareness of the ways in which his talk on race is exceptional and
potentially socially discouraged
Finally, Tyler concludes with (33-35), offering a final evaluation. Building from his
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stancetaking discussed above, in this instance Tyler observes “although people are discussing it
now / will it be important in a couple of weeks / that’s the question.” In this closing statement,
Tyler questions if the “it” in (33) and (34) will be in the public consciousness after a few weeks.
He is suggesting that the primary obstacle to continued involvement and progress in racial
conflict is that of continued interest, and that without ongoing and invested communication
between racial groups— as seen in (28-29) with “no one sits down to actually / debate this”—
the historical cycle of racially-based conflict will continue.
Conclusions
While similar in both their generally positive alignment in support of the protesters and
the defendants on trial in Jena, and in their grounding of the racial nature of the debate in historic
and lived reality, Linda and Tyler differ in both the degree to which they align themselves and in
the objects of their stancetaking. Linda critiques the actions of the Jena High School students and
the Jena residents’ minimization of the act, saying that for African Americans both in and outside
of Jena, the historical symbolism carried by the nooses that were hung as a “prank” is too
significant to be dismissed. Although she gives multiple instances of minimization and hedging
to soften the sharpness of her critique, Linda ultimately positions herself as clearly disapproving
of the way the townspeople in Jena have responded to the events leading up to the trial. While
Tyler does not align himself with the protesters as clearly as Linda does, he questions what is at
the heart of the ongoing conflict in Jena. In doing so, he transgresses the boundaries of colorblind language by first grounding the debate in historical reality, and then by directly naming
race as the primary point of contention, thus violating the foremost rule of color-blind language.
In the next and final chapter, I will examine and discuss the ways in which all four calls
employed— or noticeably did not employ— the five rules of color-blind language, discussing
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ways in which conformity to the rules emerges, or can be challenged, in an attempt to identify
and question the boundaries and functions of color-blind language.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I
know in part, but then I will know fully just as I also have been
fully known.
— 1 Corinthians 13:12

In this final chapter I conclude the analyses performed in the previous chapter, and then I
move to discuss the implications, limitations, and applicability of the principles, methods, and
research I have utilized here. Returning to the points of contrast laid out in Chapter 1 between the
people and methods employed in the Jena protest in comparison to more contemporary activism
efforts, I suggest that while racial discourse in the United States is changing in medium and aims,
the objects of protest— namely, racial inequality and disparity— remains the same. First,
though, I revisit the five rules of color-blind language, looking at the ways in which the callers
abide by, fail to use, or challenge the boundaries drawn by the use of color-blind language.
Analysis of Sources
The following section will follow the divisions used in Chapter 4, where I will first
discuss the two callers who take a negative or critical stance towards the Jena Six, before moving
to the two callers who took a generally positive stance.
The first caller, Tammy, made considerable use of the rules of avoiding direct racial
language, abstract liberalism, and diminutive language in order to take a stance that was critical
of the Jena Six and the support being given to them, and while she held her stance with a strong
degree of commitment, it was made without explicitly racial rationale. Tammy typifies speakers
who, while not appearing explicitly “racist,” nevertheless utilize hedging and downgrading
rhetorical maneuvers to soften the explicitness of their position even as they are saying
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something that, without the hedging, would be otherwise highly racial. That is, behind Tammy’s
use of abstract liberalism and minimization is a stance where racial logic is playing a role that
would be unacceptable to state directly. Tammy’s use of “you know” furthers this reasoning, as
she clearly invokes a knowledge or understanding that she assumes is shared between herself and
the audience. Yet, Tammy’s underlying reasoning follows Bourdieu’s description of the habitus,
as the understanding that she assumes is shared is never made clear or explicit and the racial
logic that organizes her statement and position can never be stated directly. Indeed, without
applying the schema of color-blind language to her statement it would be difficult to discern that
rather than merely following a common sense that is not—and cannot— be questioned, she is
instead playing within a specific, constructed, ideologically-driven field of logic.
In contrast to Tammy, Karen is much less coded in the racial aspect of her critique of
Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton and their involvement in Jena. That is, through close reading one
can perceive that it is, in fact, the racial identities of Jackson and Sharpton that make them
central to Karen’s argument. I suspect that such explicitness is why Slen appears to cut off her
call, as the direction of her statement seems to be heading towards even more direct criticism. As
I noted earlier, however, Karen fails to specify the aim of her evaluation, as seen in the use of
“they” in statements such as “they should have handled it theirselves.” While her stance is
strongly negative towards Jackson and Sharpton, and while she may be maintaining such
ambiguity in order to unknowingly abide by the rules of acceptable color-blind discourse, Karen
does not explicitly state her intentions for calling, nor does she reach a conclusive evaluation of
the Jena situation. Thus, although Karen appears to be violating the rules of color-blind language
and therefore threatening the boundaries of social acceptability, her lack of clarity in identifying
her stance object minimizes the impact her explicit racial language would otherwise have.
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Bell notes that in the context of mass communication— which these calls could be
considered a demonstration of— speakers must create a new relationship, rather than draw on an
existing one, when communicating with their audience, and in doing so the speaker essentially
says to the audience that they are bonded, or ingroup, together.221 Comparing Karen’s lack of
hedging to the numerous ways in which Tammy hedges her stance, it seems that the two callers
diverge in their assessment of the audience that they must estimate and create in the moment of
communication. That is, because both callers are in the situation of making a phone call to the CSPAN show without knowing who, specifically, is listening to them, they must quickly strategize
what reasoning will be most effective for the assumed and unseen listening audience. On the one
hand, Tammy makes effective use of hedging and minimizing and relies on assumptions of
shared knowledge in order to take her stance that is in fact quite secure, and in that sense appears
to believe that the audience may not immediately agree with her. In contrast, Karen takes a
strong stance but does so without the hedging, minimizing, or connection-building maneuvers
that Tammy uses, suggesting that Karen views the C-SPAN audience as already generally
aligned or in agreement with her and that there is less persuasive “ground” that needs to be
covered when she makes her statement. Ultimately, while Karen takes a very strong stance and
maintains it throughout her call, Tammy makes more effective use of the strategies that allow for
continued discourse and agreement-making among herself and her listening audience. In that
way, even though both hold similar attitudes about the Jena Six, Tammy does not draw as much
attention to the basis for her beliefs and thus maintains the color-blind habitus, and in contrast
Karen— although she does not intend to change her mind— is drawing attention to the
framework that undergirds her reasoning, and in that way opens the door for identification,
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challenge, and critique of the racial logic that informs her beliefs. Such a critique does happen,
then, as the racial basis for her statement moves too close to being made explicit and Slen cuts
her off from the program, effectively reinforcing the boundaries of what is acceptable in public
discourses as he places Karen’s statement outside the limits of what is allowed to be said.
At the same time, both Tammy and Karen, despite their different ends, make use of the
criminalblackman story line in their calls. Both draw upon images of black male criminality to
build a critique of those supportive of the Jena Six, but by utilizing the criminalblackman, they
are seemingly made exempt from needing to provide further information than the initial
invocation of the criminalblackman image, as I have noted by identifying where they have
notably not included certain specific details. Such usage of this particular racial stereotype is
consistent with both Tammy and Karen’s wider statements, and with Russell’s initial
observations of how the stock story functions in discourse.
The last two calls I examined, from Linda and Tyler, are generally more supportive of the
Jena Six and the protest marchers. While Linda’s and Tyler’s positions differ from each other,
overall they attempt to align themselves with those who say that there is reason for concern over
the fair treatment of the Jena Six within the legal system. However, they maneuver through what
can be said within color-blind discourse in different ways, and with varying success.
Linda employs multiple hedging maneuvers and appeals to shared knowledge in attempts
to move her audience to consider the personal impact that historic racial symbols can still hold
for people. Ultimately, however, Linda is able to alter the use of color-blind language, as she
flips the expected effects of the language: Where avoidance of direct racial language,
diminutives, and hedging are usually used to obscure the presence of a person’s beliefs about
race and instead draw attention to seemingly non-racial rationale, Linda utilizes these strategies
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to subtly introduce her directly-racial reasons for evaluating the students and townspeople in
Jena in the way that she does. That is, rather than the strategies being used to draw attention
away from a person’s negative racial attitudes, Linda uses the logic of non-direct racial language
to bring her reasoning— of which race is a central part— into the discourse without appearing to
explicitly appeal to race.
At the same time, in light of Linda’s rhetorical strategies, a noteworthy caveat is found in
Alexander’s discussion of the long-term legal significance of the Jena Six case in The New Jim
Crow. Namely, Alexander contends that without the nooses hung from the tree at Jena high
school several weeks earlier, the charges brought against the six defendants would likely not
have been seen as an instance of racially unfair prosecution, and that only the overt Jim Crow-era
symbol of the nooses allowed the entire episode of the Six to be seen and framed in the media as
being in parallel to older, more recognizable forms of racial oppression. 222 As a result, Alexander
says, the media’s presentation of the Jena Six did not ultimately result in a significant shift in
racial attitudes in the US, nor did it bring about what she deems “a new civil rights movement,”
because any injustice that was present in the Jena Six case was predicated solely upon older,
more familiar forms of racism. 223 Without the historical precedent of the nooses being narratively
linked to the assault on Barker, the color-blind discrimination that was embedded within the
historical precedent applied to the prosecution of the Jena Six— as discussed in Chapter 1—
would not necessarily be seen as an issue of racism. Thus, while Linda’s referencing of a widelyknown historical symbol of racial violence may have been empathy-building for white listeners
at the time of the C-SPAN broadcast, such reliance on historical— and in particular, pre-Civil
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Rights era— instances of racism are not necessarily sustainable or effective in establishing longterm awareness and understanding of how color-blind racism is functioning in the present.
Next in consideration of her call, through her appeals to shared knowledge as seen in her
use of “you know,” Linda attempts to build a temporary connection with her audience based on
unspoken understanding and knowledge that she believes they share. While Linda falters in that
the knowledge she bases her use of “you know” on is not necessarily shared between herself and
the audience she is trying to connect with, she utilizes the strategies offered by color-blind
discourse to challenge what can be achieved within said discourse. This is not to say that Linda
successfully challenges the limits of color-blind language in a sizable way, as she operates within
the bounds set by color-blind language and logic. Nevertheless, the way that Linda uses colorblind language to subvert color-blind logic offers paths for further inquiry into the ways that the
racial system— organized and perpetuated by racial logic— can be confronted and challenged.
Finally, Tyler pushes beyond Linda’s abidance by the rules of color-blind language as he
builds his statement and stance explicitly upon the historical reality of race and the ways that
racial identity has real and lived consequences for people. Although Tyler does not take a clear
stance for or against the protesters and the Jena Six, he does draw attention to how both white
and black racial identities have— albeit in different ways— experienced what has resulted in
them being victims in the Jena situation. By directly stating, and thereby foregrounding, the
presence of people’s embodied racial identities while also grounding those identities in historical
realities, Tyler effectively circumvents the limits that color-blind language attempts to place on
racial discourse— making explicit the very element that color-blind logic relies on remaining
unspoken and unidentified.
Each caller, then, demonstrates variations on the ways that the rules of color-blind
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language can be used, and to what ends. In all four calls, as I suggested in Chapters 2 and 3, the
use of the five rules of color-blind language worked to belie the ways in which race was playing
a central role in each caller’s statement. Following Bourdieu, each statement— with the possible
exception of Tyler’s— stayed generally within the discourse of color-blind racial logic, and in
that way the habitus of race was shared, maintained, and further established into the future as a
governing system.
In the next section, I return to the contemporary moment introduced in Chapter 1 to
suggest avenues for research into the ways that color-blind discourse will continue to function
despite the changing nature of racial protest and activism, and discuss potential applications of
the theoretical foundations introduced in this work. After a discussion of the limitations present
in the scope and productivity of this project, I conclude by challenging the notion of a future that
is inevitably governed by current color-blind language and logic.
Implications and Applications for Further Research
As suggested in the first chapter, while the public responses to the events in Jena provide
valuable insight into racial discourse and stancetaking via color-blind language, the nature and
medium of public activism, protest, and engagement has changed in substantial ways. Namely,
technological developments and the rise of social media and networking have altered the ways in
which people can meaningfully engage in protest and activism efforts. Consequently, organized
protest no longer requires a central, recognizable leader, nor does effective activism need to take
place in a set physical location; instead, more local, grassroots, and independent activism can
take place without the need for a well-known organizer or leader; or, people’s political and social
activism can take place entirely online. Indeed, such an occurrence was seen with the rapid rise
in the use and popularity of #BlackLivesMatter, and research suggests that fights for ending
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racial discrimination and inequality will continue to be mediated through digital, rather than
physical, mediums; although, this too is disparate along racial lines.
As of 2016, black social media users were twice as likely as white users to identify at
least some of what they post on social media sites as being “about race or race relations,” while
28 percent of black users said that “most or some” of what they posted was race-related
compared to 8 percent of whites. Alternatively, 67 percent of white social media users said that
none of the things they posted or shared on social media were race-related.224 With the continued
use of color-blind language as the way for white speakers in the US to frame, understand, and
express racial beliefs, and with the emergence of the internet and social media as a place for a
wide range of participation among members of all racial identities, the gap shown in the content
posted by black and white social media users opens a number of potential avenues for inquiry
and further application of the research begun here.
First, I believe there is considerable research to be done on the language and rhetorical
methods of online talk about race. Such research could examine both the language used by
activists and proponents of racial equality, such as the 28 percent of black social media users
mentioned above, and the ways in which the five rules of color-blind language that I have
presented remain consistent and/or are disrupted in online language and expressions of racial
attitudes. Socially, the United States has potentially already reached the point where protest
gatherings such as the march in Jena led by Sharpton in 2007 are no longer the most noteworthy
or effective in either gathering national attention or in leading to concrete moves towards ending
racial inequalities and disparities, and online tools for activism and protest possibly already
eclipsed older protest methods. Thus, the language, methods, and message of these new media

224

Anderson and Hitlin, “Social Media,” 2-3.

125
forms provide a wide and vibrant body of potential examination.
Second, as stated above, there is a significant split between black and white racial groups
regarding the use of social media as a platform for sharing race-related content. While not all
racial content that is shared on social media is necessarily in the service of pursuing racial
equality or civil rights, already it is apparent that black social media users draw more attention to
race through the content they post and share than white users do. Additionally, 68 percent of
black social media users said that at least some of the content they viewed was about race or
“race relations”— and 24 percent said that most of what they saw was race-related— but only 29
percent of white users said that some of what they saw on their social media pages was about
race, while 48 percent said that little of what they saw was race-related, and 16 percent said that
none of what they saw pertained to race or race issues. 225 I believe profitable research could be
done into the ways that the rules of color-blind language— and the manifestations of those
rules— remain the same or change in online environments and content as they do in “real world”
speech communication.
Third, considering the direction for research just suggested, it seems that the gap between
racial groups in what is seen on social media could be productively investigated in light of
Bourdieu’s habitus. In the preceding research, the habitus, as I have described it, acts as an
organizing structure that maintains the current racial hierarchy— in which white racial identity is
given the most power— and I believe that the absence of race-related content on white social
media users’ pages is an additional way for the racial hierarchy to remain unseen and implicit.
By race issues being unavailable— or at least not immediately present— for viewing by white
social media users, it is possible that race issues and inequalities can be denied or seen as
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nonexistent, thus reinforcing the deniability of racial inequality or the existence of a social
hierarchy. Such research would coincide, I believe, with increasing use of mobile social media
technology and emergent interest in the ways that algorithms increasingly determine what
content is displayed for different social media users, wherein social media experiences are based
upon prior online actions. That is, if a user consistently avoids or does not encounter race-related
content that challenges their present beliefs and attitudes, they are unlikely to encounter such
content in the future, thus reinforcing their present interpretive framework for racial experiences
and encounters.
Limitations
Some limitations should be noted regarding the scope and effectiveness of this research.
First, while I maintain that the Jena Six case is still a productive source for study and discussion,
the text samples used in this project limit the scope of what can be examined in terms of true
discourse. That is, because they are one-way statements given by callers in response to minimal
prompting by a television show host, the calls consist of only one speaker and are not
conversational. If multi-speaker conversations regarding the same Jena Six topic were available,
I believe much more productive analysis could be done in terms of alignment between speakers.
Because the calls used in this project have only one speaker, it is possible to discuss callers’
stance object and their evaluation of that object, but elaborations on how and who they are in
alignment with are limited. In contrast, data types such as observed conversations between
multiple people would be more fruitful in future examinations of color-blindness and its
interactions with conversational stancetaking.
Second, based on Bonilla-Silva’s system of color-blind logic that I have described as
corresponding to Bourdieu’s habitus, systems of racial organization and logic are unavailable for
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identification and critique. Similarly, the color-blind language that structures and maintains the
racial-system is, in order to ensure the protection of the system, never explicitly about race. Such
constraints are inherent to the very language I am seeking to identify within my analyses, and
thus within the calls I examined it is possible that the points of speech that the callers left vague
and seemingly non-racial— which I interpreted as being a moment of color-blind language
expression in what would be an otherwise racially-explicit statement— were just that: non-racial.
In the moments of ambiguity in each of the calls I discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible that
outside of a few notably explicit exceptions, none of the four callers were in fact talking about
race, and that color-blind logic and the language that supports it does not exist. Here I defer to
Bonilla-Silva, who suggests that because authors come with their own theoretical and ideological
orientations, their explanations of phenomena must be evaluated as if they were maps. That is, to
borrow Bonilla-Silva’s expression, my “cartographic efforts” must be judged on their usefulness
in increasing understanding for their readers; their accuracy in depicting the situation at hand;
and their success in bringing to light elements that have not be previously explored. 226
Color-Blindness and Possible Futures
Bell hypothesizes that “convergence win[s] friends and divergence win[s] arguments,”227
and a similar reasoning could be applied to the multiple depictions of color-blind language use
and strategies seen in the four statements that I analyzed in Chapter 4. For speakers who remain
within the rules of color-blind language, it seems that while they are held back from making
statements that are too explicit or socially unacceptable, they are also able to maintain a position
that is secure and not disruptive to their self-perception or status within the habitus of the racial
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hierarchy. Furthermore, the habitus of color-blindness provides a familiar, all-encompassing
logic for interpretation and existence within the world of racial identities. In contrast, for those
who attempt to move beyond the familiar restraints of racial discourse, the rules of color-blind
language hinder the ground that can be claimed against the habitus of racial organization, yet I
believe it is possible to move beyond the present racial system by conscientiously calling out,
and then selectively disregarding, the rules of color-blind language.
If color-blind language provides the framework for the color-blind racial system, then the
habitus of color-blindness is made up of, and exists within, a complex and interconnected field of
lived realities, institutions, and ideologies that will be difficult to disentangle. Yet, I believe the
base of ongoing conflict and contemporary concerns of race in the United States is found in the
continued reliance upon language that will never be able to fundamentally change present
situations or concerns, and the use and function of that language must be called out. The
potential for change, or “[t]he possibility of awakening political consciousness,” as Shotwell
says, “depends on the possibility of articulating new available discourses.”228 Rather than
continuing to play, as it were, within the circle drawn by color-blind language and thought, a
new racial discourse— one that acknowledges and speaks of both the constructed and artificial
nature, yet real consequences, of racial identity— must continuously be sought and enacted.
Recalling Bourdieu, the habitus of color-blindness not only interprets and maintains itself in the
present, but its inability to be to be identified and questioned means that it also constructs itself
into the future, thereby limiting perceived openings for change. Indeed, as he says, “[t]he relation
to what is possible is a relation to power; and the sense of the probable future is constituted in the
prolonged relationship with a world structured according to the categories of the possible (for us)
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and the impossible (for us).”229 The present habitus of color-blindness circumscribes and
constrains what is considered “possible,” thereby binding ways of challenging present and future
inequalities within a hierarchy that actively functions to maintain itself. The racial logic that
governed the past, and continues to govern the present, is that which has resulted in and sustains
current conditions. Outside of what is currently understood as possible, then, is where a new and
not-yet-imagined futures lies— a future in which emancipatory discourses may yet be found.
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TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS
(modified from Schiffrin, 1987 (Discourse Markers); Tannen 1989 (Talking Voices))
.
,
!
/
?
…
′
CAPS
[
Z
:
::
“”
( )
hhh
=

/?/
{ }

indicates sentence-final falling intonation
indicates clause-final intonation (“more to come”)
indicates exclamatory intonation
raised pitch on a single segment
indicates final rise, as in a yes-no question
three dots in transcripts indicate pause of ½ second or more
accent indicates primary stress
indicate
emphatic stress
brackets show overlapping speech.
no perceptible inter-turn pause, placed between the two lines
colon following vowel indicates elongated vowel sound
extra colon indicates further elongation
hyphen indicates glottal stop: sound abruptly cut off
quotation marks highlight dialogue
parentheses indicate “parenthetical” intonation: lower amplitude and pitch
indicates laughter (number of h’s indicate duration by second)
equal sign at right of line indicates segment to be continued after
another’s turn; equal sign at left of line indicates continuation of prior
segment after another’s turn
indicates inaudible utterance
brackets indicate comment on what is said
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